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Articles 
THE AMERICAN NEGLIGENCE RULE 
Mark F. Grady* 
Abstract 
This Article reviews and proposes a revision of the orthodox academic view 
of the negligence breach of duty requirement.  The orthodox view comes from 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s treatment in his book, The Common Law, and stresses 
the defendant’s conduct.  According to Holmes, negligence is conduct “on the 
wrong side of the line.”  Hence, negligence is the failure to have a spark arrester 
on one’s locomotive, the failure to check one’s blind spot before changing lanes, 
and the failure to retrieve all sponges before closing a patient.  Legal economists 
have built on this view.  They have argued that negligent conduct is that which 
fails the Learned Hand formula, in other words, conduct that lacks cost-beneficial 
precautions.  Legal economists have also posited that juries as well as judges use 
cost-benefit analysis to assess negligent conduct.  Legal philosophers, although 
they often reject cost-benefit analysis, also adhere to Holmes’s conduct theory of 
breach of duty.  Nevertheless, a close analysis of modern negligence cases reveals 
that American juries are often allowed and even encouraged to forgive negligent 
conduct.  They routinely forgive failures to check blind spots, failures to retrieve 
all sponges from patients, failures of pharmacists to dispense the correct drugs, 
and the like.  In the present century, this practice of jury forgiveness, and courts’ 
acceptance of it, seems to be becoming more common.  This Article explores the 
true legal structure of breach of duty and how it diverges from Holmes’s conduct 
theory and the orthodox academic view of negligence, which is still based on 
Holmes’s conduct theory. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract........................................................................................................... 545 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... 545 
I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 547 
II. HOLMES’S CONDUCT THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE .................................. 548 
                                                 
*  Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; and Director, UCLA Center for 
Law and Economics. 
Grady: The American Negligence Rule
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
546 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
A. The Continued Generality of Negligence Jury Instructions .................. 556 
B. The Asymmetry of Judgments as a Matter of Law ................................ 559 
C. The Reality of Negligence Litigation...................................................... 560 
III. THE LEARNED HAND FORMULA .......................................................... 563 
A. The False Academic Conception of the Learned Hand Formula’s Role .. 563 
B. The Learned Hand Formula as a Decision Rule for Triers of Fact ......... 564 
IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS THE MAIN CONSTRAINT ON JURIES’ 
BREACH OF DUTY DETERMINATIONS ................................................... 569 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Ground for Judgment as a Matter of Law for 
the Defendant ......................................................................................... 569 
1. The Burden of Additional Precautions was Outweighed by the 
Reduction in Risk that Would Have Been Produced by Them ..... 570 
2. The Risk that Harmed the Plaintiff was “Unforeseeable,” which in 
this Context Usually Means Very Small from An Ex Ante Point of 
View ...................................................................................................... 576 
3. The Plaintiff Failed to Identify an Untaken Precaution or Other 
Fault by the Defendant in a Case in which Res Ipsa was 
Unavailable .......................................................................................... 578 
4. The Risk that Harmed the Plaintiff was “Obvious” to the 
Plaintiff ................................................................................................. 578 
5. The Undisputed Facts on the Judgment Record Showed that the 
Defendant Used All Cost-Beneficial Precautions ........................... 579 
6. Expert Evidence was Required to Show breach of Duty and was 
Absent on Record ................................................................................ 580 
7. The Defendant’s Act was Involuntary ............................................. 580 
B. A Correlative Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis .......................................... 580 
V. WHEN CAN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BE A CEILING ON PRECAUTION 
REQUIREMENTS? .................................................................................... 581 
A. The Inevitability of Valuations of Human Life and Limb ...................... 581 
B. A Simple Taxonomy of Precautions ....................................................... 582 
1. Durable and Nondurable Precautions ............................................. 582 
2. Precaution Plans .................................................................................. 582 
3. Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Nondurable Precautions ...... 583 
C. How Does the Taxonomy Aid Our Understanding of Negligence 
Practice? ................................................................................................ 583 
D. “The Quality of Mercy Is Not Strain’d” ............................................... 584 
1. Faulty or omitted Durable Precautions ............................................ 584 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss3/2
2019] The American Negligence Rule 547 
2. Faulty or Omitted Precaution Plans ................................................. 585 
3. Faulty or Omitted Heterogeneous Nondurable Precautions ........ 585 
4. Omitted Homogeneous Nondurable Precautions .......................... 586 
VI. WHAT NEGLIGENT CONDUCT CAN JURIES NOT FORGIVE? ................. 588 
A. When a Party Engaged in Deliberate Gross Negligence ........................ 588 
B. When Jury Bias Was Probable ............................................................... 589 
C. Idiosyncratic Statutory Violations ......................................................... 590 
VII. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? ............................................................. 593 
A. Inadmissibility of Prior Similar Incidents of Negligence ....................... 593 
B. A Stochastic Tax .................................................................................... 595 
VIII. EXPLAINING DEFENDANTS’ APPELLATE ADVANTAGE ........................ 596 
IX. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 603 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
During this century, it has become increasingly evident that modern 
negligence practice can no longer fit comfortably within traditional 
academic theories.1  During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, scholars vigorously debated whether civil negligence was 
essentially a state of mind or conduct.  The greatest American legal scholar 
of that era, Oliver Wendell Holmes, became the champion of the conduct 
theory, and in academic circles his ideas won out.  Holmes was an 
American pragmatist, and his conduct theory of negligence was a victory 
for the pragmatist idea that the social world must be judged by objective 
data, not by interior mental processes.2  Nevertheless, Holmes certainly 
did not pull the conduct theory of negligence exclusively from his 
pragmatist ideals.  As he demonstrated in his scholarly work, conduct 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1187–
24 (2001). 
2 Holmes wrote: 
[I]t must be borne in mind that law only works within the sphere of the 
senses. If the external phenomena, the manifest acts and omissions, are 
such as it requires, it is wholly indifferent to the internal phenomena of 
conscience. A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct 
is within the rules. In other words, the standards of the law are external 
standards, and, however much it may take moral considerations into 
account, it does so only for the purpose of drawing a line between such 
bodily motions and rests as it permits, and such as it does not. What the 
law really forbids, and the only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong 
side of the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 110 (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON 
LAW]. 
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conceptions of negligence and its precursors go back to the Year Books.3  
As we will see, however, the question is not whether the conduct theory 
of negligence possesses some validity; it certainly is a useful explanation 
for many case results.  The problem is that the conduct theory does not 
account for all negligence case results; many are plainly inconsistent with 
it. 
The focus of this Article will be on courts’ increasing willingness to 
allow juries “to forgive” objectively defined negligence.  This is mainly an 
American story for the simple reason that most common-law jurisdictions 
no longer try negligence cases to juries.  Still, as we will see, in U.S. courts, 
encouragement of jury forgiveness has become more pronounced as the 
years have passed.  Throughout much of the twentieth century, if a jury 
did forgive a defendant’s objective negligence, the trial judge, acting 
within a broad discretion, would usually order a new trial for the plaintiff.  
This order would usually prompt a settlement for less than full damages.  
Increasingly, trial courts are less likely to order a new trial for plaintiffs 
whose defendants have been forgiven.  They let the jury’s forgiveness stick 
and even order the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s litigation costs.4  Some 
prior commentators have noticed this development and call these cases 
instances of “jury nullification,” following terminology originally used in 
the criminal setting.5  This terminology seems to suggest that courts or 
other authorities oppose jury forgiveness and think of it as anti-social.  
Instead, the courts fully accept jury forgiveness as a fundamental part of 
the orthodox negligence rule.  Indeed, the practice dates from the birth of 
accident law in the Middle Ages. 
II.  HOLMES’S CONDUCT THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE 
At the turn of the twentieth century the leading problem in tort law 
was whether civil negligence was conduct or a state of mind.  In 1881, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes initiated this debate by forcefully claiming that 
negligence was exclusively conduct, namely, conduct that fell below due 
care.  He wrote that a man could have “as bad a heart as he chooses” but 
would still avoid liability so long as he stays on the right side of the 
                                                 
3 HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 107.  Holmes is quoting Judge Rede:  “In 
trespass the intent” (we may say more broadly, the defendant’s state of mind) “cannot be 
construed.”  The parenthetical interpolation is Holmes’s. 
4 See, e.g., Minnegren v. Nozar, 4 Cal. App. 5th 500, 514 (Ct. App. 2016) (ordering plaintiff 
to pay defendant’s court costs in case in which defendant failed to yield right-of-way and t-
boned plaintiff); discussion infra text accompanying note 171. 
5 See, e.g., Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1603 (2001). 
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conduct line.6  This idea was soon embraced by powerful allies, notably 
James Barr Ames,7 Henry T. Terry,8 and Henry W. Edgerton.9  This 
position became the orthodoxy of the twentieth century and the 
foundation of its leading scholarly theories.10 
Holmes’s conduct theory came early in the history of the modern 
negligence rule.  The case of Vaughan v. Menlove,11 from 1837, has a good 
claim to be considered the first case decided on a negligence theory.12  The 
defendant had constructed his hayrick in a way that made spontaneous 
                                                 
6 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 110.  For the full quotation, see supra note 
2. 
7 See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908) (stating in 
negligence law "[t]he ethical standard reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard 
of acting at one's peril").  Ames opened his article with a quotation from an early English 
chief justice:  “The thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil himself knoweth not the 
thought of man.”  Id. at 97. 
8 See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1915) ("Negligence is conduct, 
not a state of mind."). 
9 See Henry W. Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference:  The Relation of Mental 
States to Negligence, 39 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1925).  He wrote: 
Negligence neither is nor involves (“presupposes”) either indifference, 
or inadvertence, or any other mental characteristic, quality, state, or 
process. Negligence is unreasonably dangerous conduct—i.e., conduct 
abnormally likely to cause harm. Freedom from negligence (commonly 
called “due care”) does not require care, or any other mental 
phenomenon, but requires only that one’s conduct be reasonably safe—
as little likely to cause harm as the conduct of a normal person would 
be. 
Id. at 852. 
10 See Patrick J. Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes's Theory of Torts, 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 681, 
740 (1983) (assessing Holmes’s influence on tort theory); Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001) (same).  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 29, 38 (1972) [hereinafter Posner, Theory of Negligence] (defining negligence as 
substandard conduct as revealed by the Learned Hand formula).  According to Posner, juries 
also apply the Learned Hand formula and assess whether conduct was substandard.  Id. at 
51–52. 
11 See Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492; 7 Car. & P. 525 (leaving it to the 
jury to determine if defendant acted as a prudent man).  
12 Another contender for the “first negligence case” is Christie v. Griggs (1809) 170 Eng. 
Rep. 1088; 2 Camp. 79, which was brought by a passenger aboard the defendant’s stagecoach 
that crashed because of a broken axle.  Id. at 1088–89.  In this case, however, the parties had 
entered a contract for common carriage, and the plaintiff brought his suit not as “negligence” 
but as “assumpsit,” reflecting either the contract itself or the “undertaking” by the defendant 
to carry the plaintiff to his destination.  Id.  Christie v. Griggs is now regarded as a negligence 
case in which the defendant’s duty of care arose from the special relationship of common 
carrier-passenger or from the defendant’s “undertaking,” but it was not brought on a 
negligence theory.  On the other hand, the case report for Vaughan v. Menlove did stress that 
it had been brought on a “negligence” theory and also that it was a case “of the first 
impression.”  Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 492. The modern negligence cases are commonly 
understood to have evolved from older cases brought under the writs of trespass vi et armis 
and trespass on the case. 
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combustion a risk.  His neighbor, the plaintiff, warned him several times 
that the hayrick was dangerous, but the defendant answered that “he 
would chance it” and, even more maddeningly, that his property “was 
insured.”13  When the predictable occurred and the resulting fire burned 
down the plaintiff’s cottages, he sued for negligence.  The jury was 
instructed that “the question for them to consider, was, whether the fire 
had been occasioned by gross negligence on the part of the [d]efendant; 
adding, that [the defendant] was bound to proceed with such reasonable 
caution as a prudent man would have exercised under such 
circumstances.”14  After the jury had found for the plaintiff, the defendant 
attacked the verdict on the ground that “he ought not to be responsible for 
the misfortune of not possessing the highest order of intelligence” and that 
the jury should have been asked simply whether the defendant had acted 
“bona fide to the best of his judgment.”15  The appellate court held that the 
jury had indeed been properly instructed and that the defendant’s 
proposed conception of the negligence rule (mere good faith in using 
precaution) would be too subjective.16 
Thus, the Vaughan v. Menlove court accepted an objective conception 
of negligence, but it was an objective definition of a negligent state of mind 
that seemingly defined the tort under the Vaughan court’s discussion. 
This was not the end of the matter, however, because Vaughan v. 
Menlove was soon followed by Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.17  That 
case involved a municipal fire hydrant system that failed during a period 
of exceptionally cold weather and flooded the plaintiff’s house.  The 
plaintiff’s case at trial was that the defendant had noticed that ice had 
encrusted the hydrant plugs that needed to pop out to relieve the stress of 
expanding frozen water below.18  The system was so new and the weather 
so extreme that the defendant had failed to realize before the accident that 
the plugs needed to be cleaned in cold weather.  The appellate court set 
aside the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff and entered judgment as a matter 
of law for the defendant.19  During this judgment, Baron Alderson gave 
the following definition:  “Negligence is the omission to do something 
which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which 
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing 
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.”20  This 
                                                 
13 See Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 491. 
14 Id. at 492. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 494. 
17 See Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047; 11 Exch. 78. 
18 Id. at 1048. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 1049. 
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was also an objective test of negligence, but here the focus was on 
reasonable conduct, not on a reasonable state of mind as in Vaughan v. 
Menlove.  Alderson and his colleagues found that the defendant had not 
been negligent because its conduct had been reasonable given the lack of 
experience with how this type of water system would perform under 
frigid conditions.21  The accident was “unforeseeable.”  This seminal case 
was early in a cascade of similar cases limiting juries’ powers to find for 
plaintiffs based on omitted precautions that could not be justified on cost-
benefit grounds.22 
In the early scholarly debates about the definition of negligence, these 
two early cases—Vaughan and Blyth—became contested beacons, each 
suggesting an objective standard of negligence but one focusing on the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s state of mind and the other on the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.23 
In 1861, writing five years after Blyth and twenty years before Holmes, 
the English legal theorist John Austin claimed that negligence was 
essentially a faulty state of mind.24  In developing his theory, Austin chose 
as his principal example a “nondurable precaution,” that is, precaution 
that does not last long and typically must be used repetitively.25  We will 
see that conduct theorists, such as Holmes and his modern academic 
followers like Richard Posner, tend to focus on “durable” precautions, 
such as worn-out metal “nosing” on the edges of wooden steps and 
missing “safety appliances” on trains.26  Austin’s featured untaken 
precaution was the failure of a shooter to advert to the possibility that his 
bullet might pass through his target on his garden fence to a public road 
beyond.27  Austin’s detailed theory entailed an examination of the various 
                                                 
21 See id. (finding that defendant’s lack of experience with the risk in question resulted in 
unforeseeability). 
22 See infra text accompanying note 96. 
23 Compare Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493; 7 Car. & P. 525 (focusing 
on state of mind), with Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049; 
11 Exch. 780 (focusing on conduct). 
24 See JOHN AUSTIN, Lecture XX:  Negligence, Heedlessness, and Rashness, in LECTURES ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 425–34 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter AUSTIN, LECTURES]. 
25 Id. at 427. 
26 See, e.g., HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 110.  See also Posner, Theory of 
Negligence, supra note 10, at 38. 
27 Austin’s main example of negligence was: 
When I fire at the mark chalked upon the fence, it occurs to my mind 
that a shot may pierce the fence, and may chance to hit a passenger.  But 
without examining carefully the ground of my conclusion, I conclude 
that the fence is sufficiently thick to prevent a shot from passing to the 
road.  Or, without giving myself the trouble to look into the road, I 
assume that a passenger is not there, because the road is seldom passed.  
In either case, my confidence is rash; and, through my rashness or 
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mental states that would qualify to demonstrate negligence.  These 
included “heedlessness,” “rashness,” “temerity,” “foolhardiness,” and 
“inadvertence.”28 
When Holmes wrote twenty years later, he used Austin’s theory as a 
foil,29 arguing that Austin’s theories were inapposite to tort because 
Austin was a criminalist and a moralist.30  Holmes boldly asserted that 
negligence liability could depend either on conduct or on the actor’s 
“blameworthiness.”31  In his view, no third alternative existed and neither 
did any middle ground. 
In favor of his conduct theory, Holmes offered both doctrinal and 
policy arguments.  As to legal doctrine, Holmes argued that the writ of 
trespass, from which negligence sprung, always depended on conduct.32  
He gave many examples from the doctrine of trespass to land or “trespass 
quare clausum fregit,” as it was known in his day.33  The important thing 
was whether the defendant’s conduct was on the “right side” of the 
property line.  He argued that the theory of being on the “right side” of 
the line extended to negligence, sometimes literally, as under rules of 
traffic and navigation, originally imported from England.34 
From a policy point of view, there are three main reasons for 
preferring a conduct standard to a standard that depends on a defendant’s 
state of mind.  The first reason is that when the negligence standard is 
based on conduct, strangers can coordinate their precaution with each 
other.  Holmes seems to suggest this as a reason for a conduct standard 
and then backs off.35 
The second reason is that a conduct standard is easier for a tribunal to 
measure than the defendant’s state of mind.  Tort liability based on 
blameworthiness inevitably depends on assessing the actor’s mental 
processes, whereas conduct does not.  Therefore, conduct is more 
                                                 
temerity, I am the author of the mischief.  My assumption is founded 
upon evidence which the event shews to be worthless, and of which I 
should discover the worthlessness if I scrutinised it as I ought. 
AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 24, at 428. 
28 Id. at 427–28. 
29 See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 81–82. 
30 See id. at 81–83. 
31 Id. at 125–26.   
32 See id. at 78, 80–81.   
33 See id. at 83 (arguing that the writ of trespass was dependent on the actor’s conduct, 
regardless of the actor’s intent).   
34 Id. at 113–14.   
35 Holmes wrote:  “When a man has a distinct defect of such a nature that all can recognize 
it as making certain precautions impossible, he will not be held answerable for not taking 
them.”  Id. at 109.  Holmes’s stress of “distinct defects that all can recognize” logically leads 
to the idea that these challenges can be the basis of coordination between injurer and victim, 
but he does not stress this idea.  Id. 
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knowable than blameworthiness.  Holmes stresses this reason and argues 
that interior states of mind are inherently unknowable.36 
The third reason, which Holmes fully embraces and articulates with 
several examples, is that a conduct standard lends itself to the 
development of precedent that will clarify rules of conduct.37 
To see Holmes’s thinking, we can use the same case example that he 
chose as an illustration.  That was Crafter v. Metropolitan Railway,38 which 
involved an ordinary slip and fall allegedly due to the defendant’s fault.  
On July 28, 1864, soon after the construction of London’s first 
underground railway, the plaintiff, while exiting his train at King’s Cross 
Station, walked up the defendant’s exit steps.  He slipped and fell, injuring 
himself badly.  The stairway in question was six feet wide and had a wall 
on each side.  The plaintiff was familiar with the stairway; he had used it 
every work day for almost eighteen months, which would have been 
practically from its first construction.  Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleged 
that this stairway was unreasonably unsafe, and his attorney proposed 
three untaken precautions supported by two witnesses, at least one of 
them an expert.  First, the brass nosing on the edge of the stairs, although 
originally roughened by the contractor, was worn slick.  This was 
unsurprising because the evidence also indicated that every month 43,000 
passengers used this stairway.  The second untaken precaution was the 
lack of handrails.  The third untaken precaution was that the nosing 
should have been made of lead and not of brass because lead would have 
stayed rough, presumably because constant traffic would have scarred 
this softer metal.39  The defendant submitted no evidence but instead 
rested mute, a dangerous trial strategy today but apparently common at 
the time. 
The trial court instructed the jurors that the question for them was 
“whether or not the staircase afforded reasonable accommodation to the 
public.”40  In its verdict, the jury found for the plaintiff that the staircase 
was “unreasonable” and awarded him £105.41 
The unanimous appellate court held that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the verdict and entered final judgment for the defendant, 
ordering that the plaintiff take nothing from his action.42 
                                                 
36 See id. at 107–09.   
37 Id. at 111–13, 120–29. 
38 Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1866) 1 LRCP 300 (Eng.).  Holmes mistakenly called the 
case “Crafton [sic] v. Metropolitan Railway Co.” in his discussion.  See HOLMES, COMMON 
LAW, supra note 2, at 120. 
39 See Crafter, 1 LRCP at 300–01.  
40 Id. at 301 (emphasis added). 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 301–04.   
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Before we get into deeper issues, we can note the reasons the court 
gave for its decision.  It first stressed that the plaintiff was familiar with 
these steps and the danger that caused him to trip.43  Second, the court 
said that handrails would not have done much good because, when trains 
unloaded, this staircase was so crowded that pedestrians could not always 
reach a handrail.44  Third, the court noted that brass nosing was customary 
on similar stairways.45  Justice Willes, who wrote the most influential 
opinion, said:  “We all know that brass is a material which is commonly 
used for the nosing of stairs in public offices, steam-boats on the river, and 
other places of much resort.”46 
The bigger question for Holmes was how to understand this decision 
and similar decisions as consistent with the rule of law.  What was the 
precise relationship between the judge’s realm and the jury’s in this case 
and all such cases? 
He started by noting that even back in his day lawyers said that 
negligence presented a “mixed question of law and fact.”47  If that is so, 
Holmes reasoned, the breach of duty question can be broken down into 
two separate questions:  (1) what exactly did the defendant do or omit to 
do; and (2) did the defendant’s conduct meet the legal standard?48  The 
difficulty was that the facts were so clear that the question given to the 
Crafter jury seemed to concern only the second question; under clear and 
undisputed facts the jury had been asked only whether the defendant’s 
conduct was “reasonable.”  This seems to be a legal and not a factual 
question.  Still, Holmes thought it would be reasonable for the court to 
hear the jury’s answer: 
When a case arises in which the standard of conduct, pure 
and simple, is submitted to the jury, the explanation is 
plain.  It is that the court, not entertaining any clear views 
of public policy applicable to the matter, derives the rule 
to be applied from daily experience, as it has been agreed 
that the great body of the law of tort has been derived.  
But the court further feels that it is not itself possessed of 
sufficient practical experience to lay down the rule 
intelligently.  It conceives that twelve men taken from the 
practical part of the community can aid its judgment.  
                                                 
43 Id. at 301, 303, 305.    
44 Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1866) 1 LRCP 300, 302–05 (Eng.).  
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 303.  
47 See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 122.   
48 Id.  
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Therefore it aids its conscience by taking the opinion of 
the jury.49 
The worry was, however, that different juries might answer the 
question of negligence differently in future stairway cases and other cases 
that were basically the same.  In short, can we tolerate a situation of 
“justice luck” where one owner is liable and another immune with 
basically the same stairway?  Holmes recoiled against this possibility and 
invented a solution.  He said that a trial judge with experience would see 
how juries were answering the negligence question in common types of 
cases, and once the general answer was clear, could order liability as a 
matter of law or no liability as a matter of law in different types of cases.  
These decisions would become legal precedents and could be refined as 
time passed and even altered as technology progressed.  Indeed, if courts 
did not engage in this legal pruning, Holmes worried that they “would 
leave all our rights and duties throughout a great part of the law to the 
necessarily more or less accidental feelings of a jury.”50 
Holmes argued that these precedential rules of precaution would still 
be limited by the doctrine of excuses and justifications,51 but these would 
also be objectively defined.  Thus, a person with “pronounced” mental 
illness52 might be excused for being on the wrong side of the line, as might 
someone seeking to avoid a dangerous obstacle on the right side of the 
line. 
Thus, Holmes thought that negligence law could retain its law-like 
quality and prevent the “accidental feelings of a jury” from holding sway 
only if negligence litigation were governed by two principles.  First, jury 
instructions should become increasingly refined and detailed as the law 
of precaution develops.  Juries might be instructed that particular 
precautions were required under particular conditions and would be left 
to determine whether the triggering conditions were or were not present 
at the time the accident in question occurred and whether the required 
precaution was used.  Second, judges would have the power in clear cases 
to prevent or reject a jury verdict and order judgment as a matter of law.  
Holmes thought these judgments would be symmetrically distributed 
with judgments of breach of duty as a matter of law as common as the 
opposite.53  Neither of these recommendations has been followed by the 
courts, and we will consider them in order. 
                                                 
49 Id. at 123. 
50 Id. at 126. 
51 Id. at 113. 
52 Id. at 109.  
53 Holmes presciently used the example of a railroad grade crossing to illustrate his 
reasoning: 
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A. The Continued Generality of Negligence Jury Instructions 
Most legal analysts see a division of labor between the judge and the 
jury that does not exist in negligence cases.  Supposedly, the judge is the 
law explainer, and the jury is the law applier.  Again, Holmes expressed 
the usual view.  He said that when the issue in a negligence case is whether 
a party’s conduct came up to the legal standard of care—not so much what 
the defendant’s conduct actually was—that the judge could explain this 
legal standard to the jury in detail: 
If there is such a dispute, it is entirely possible to give a 
series of hypothetical instructions adapted to every state 
of facts which it is open to the jury to find.54 
Moreover, as a trial judge becomes experienced with accident 
situations like the case at bar, the judge can issue directed verdicts in more 
and more cases.  Even in those cases in which the judge wants the views 
of laypeople from the community as an “aid [to the judge’s] conscience,” 
with more experience he or she can do even better at explaining what the 
detailed breach of duty standard is.55 
                                                 
If the whole evidence in the case was that a party, in full command of 
his senses and intellect, stood on a railway track, looking at an 
approaching engine until it ran him down, no judge would leave it to 
the jury to say whether the conduct was prudent.  If the whole evidence 
was that he attempted to cross a level track, which was visible for half a 
mile each way, and on which no engine was in sight, no court would 
allow a jury to find negligence.  Between these extremes are cases which 
would go to the jury. But it is obvious that the limit of safety in such 
cases, supposing no further elements present, could be determined 
almost to a foot by mathematical calculation. 
Id. at 128–29.  The example was prescient because later, when he was a Supreme Court 
Justice, Holmes sought to implement his thinking by making someone struck by a train 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.  See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 
66, 69 (1927) (holding plaintiff contributorily negligent for not getting out of his car to check 
whether railroad tracks were clear).  The case was ceremoniously limited by a later court.  
See Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 103 (1934) (finding, under circumstances somewhat 
different from those in Goodman, plaintiff did not need to get out of the car to look down the 
tracks). 
54 Id. at 122. 
55 Holmes wrote: 
If, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from failure to comply with 
fixed and uniform standards of external conduct, which every man is 
presumed and required to know, it is obvious that it ought to be 
possible, sooner or later, to formulate these standards at least to some 
extent, and that to do so must at last be the business of the court. It is 
equally clear that the featureless generality, that the defendant was 
bound to use such care as a prudent man would do under the 
circumstances, ought to be continually giving place to the specific one, 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss3/2
2019] The American Negligence Rule 557 
The actual law of negligence has developed in the opposite direction 
from Holmes’s views.  The most common negligence instruction is the 
reasonable person test, quite similar to Baron Alderson’s definition of 
negligence in the 1856 case of Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 
discussed above.56  Many similar versions exist; the following is the New 
York version, which retains the “featureless generality”57 that Holmes 
deplored: 
Negligence is lack of ordinary care.  It is a failure to use 
that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person 
would have used under the same circumstances.  
Negligence may arise from doing an act that a reasonably 
prudent person would not have done under the same 
circumstances, or, on the other hand, from failing to do an 
act that a reasonably prudent person would have done 
under the same circumstances.58 
This “reasonably prudent person” test will be called the “objective 
standard” because it frames the negligence issue, as Holmes did, in terms 
of conduct, not thought processes (the contrary position of Austin).  It is 
not widely realized, however, that this most common jury instruction 
poses a metaphysical question in the most usual type of case to which it 
applies, a common and obvious error in failing to use some reasonable 
precaution, such as on one occasion failing to check a supermarket floor 
                                                 
that he was bound to use this or that precaution under these or those 
circumstances. The standard which the defendant was bound to come 
up to was a standard of specific acts or omissions, with reference to the 
specific circumstances in which he found himself. 
Id. at 124. 
56 See Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049; 11 Exch. 780. 
57 HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 111. 
58 Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, Association of Supreme Court Justices, N.Y. 
Pattern Jury Instruction—Civil 2:10 (Dec. 2016 update).  The corresponding California 
instruction reads as follows: 
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent harm to 
oneself or to others. 
A person can be negligent by acting or by failing to act.  A person is 
negligent if he or she does something that a reasonably careful person 
would not do in the same situation or fails to do something that a 
reasonably careful person would do in the same situation. 
You must decide how a reasonably careful person would have acted in 
[name of plaintiff/defendant]’s situation. 
Judicial Council of California, Civil Jury Instruction 401, Basic Standard of Care (Sept. 2003) 
(Westlaw).  See also Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, 
Ill. Pattern Jury Instruction—Civil 10.01 (Westlaw). 
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for newly fallen slippery debris.59  The instruction does not explain 
whether the jury can forgive such errors on the theory that even 
reasonably prudent people sometimes commit them.  Each individual jury 
must decide whether any given error was or was not negligence.  Thus, 
juries do have the power to forgive mistakes, but they are not usually told 
that they have this power.  They must infer the power under all the 
circumstances of the case, not infer the power, or not exercise the power if 
they have inferred it.  The parties’ attorneys may make arguments to the 
jury on this subject, but the judge typically tells them nothing in the 
instructions about how to deal with it.60 
California and other states have recently made significant changes in 
their pattern jury instructions on medical malpractice, positively 
suggesting to juries that they may forgive a doctor’s error.  Suppose a 
surgeon has failed to count the sponges placed in a patient and has left 
one there.61  In California, the following instruction would now be proper: 
[A/An] [insert type of medical practitioner] is not 
necessarily negligent just because [his/her] efforts are 
unsuccessful or [he/she] makes an error that was 
reasonable under the circumstances.  [A/An] [insert type 
of medical practitioner] is negligent only if [he/she] was not 
as skillful, knowledgeable, or careful as other reasonable 
[insert type of medical practitioners] would have been in 
similar circumstances.62 
                                                 
59 See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 111. 
60 See, e.g., Smith v. Canevary, 553 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding 
"unavoidable accident" instruction improper in Florida, and definition of negligence for jury 
should track Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks language and should be kept simple); Shumaker 
v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991 (Ala. 1990) (ruling "honest mistake" or "good faith error" by a 
physician no longer good instruction in Alabama medical malpractice cases). 
61 See Akridge v. Noble, 41 S.E. 78, 78 (Ga. 1902). 
62 Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction 505, Success Not Required (new 
Sept. 2003) (Westlaw). The Missouri Approved Jury Instruction (Civil) 21.01 (7th ed.) 
provides as follows: 
Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe: 
First, defendant (here set out act or omission complained of; e.g., “failed 
to set plaintiff’s broken leg bones in natural alignment,” or “left a sponge 
in plaintiff’s chest after performing an operation,” or “failed to 
administer tetanus antitoxin”), and 
Second, defendant was thereby negligent, and 
Third, as a direct result of such negligence plaintiff sustained damage. 
* [unless you believe plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of 
Instruction Number ________(here insert number of affirmative defense 
instruction)]. 
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This instruction actively encourages forgiveness of a “left sponge” error 
because it asks the jury to consider whether the surgeon in question was 
as careful as other surgeons who, as the jury may surmise, also 
occasionally make the same type of error.  The instruction encourages 
evidence about the surgeon’s subjective thought processes, as John Austin 
would have wished.  Was this surgeon thinking about safety?  Did his or 
her colleagues believe that this surgeon was safety-minded?63  In this 
realm, Austin’s subjective standard of negligence has seemingly replaced 
Holmes’s objective standard. 
This is not quite the revolution that it appears.  In the medical 
malpractice area, after trials in which verdicts have been challenged, 
courts have long held in manifold ways that a party’s “mistakes” or 
“errors” do not necessarily equate to negligence.64 
B. The Asymmetry of Judgments as a Matter of Law 
Holmes thought that courts’ peremptory judgments for plaintiffs 
would be approximately equal in number to those for defendants.65  
Nevertheless, if we look closely at U.S. common-law breach of duty cases, 
we find an astounding asymmetry.  Although nonsuits and directed 
verdicts for defendants are indeed common, directed verdicts and 
judgments as a matter of law for plaintiffs are astonishingly rare.  With 
common-law negligence cases, which in the U.S. remain jury-eligible, 
                                                 
Although this instruction seems to be quite harsh on surgeons who have left sponges in their 
patients, it cautions that the jury must also find that the surgeon was “negligent” in leaving 
a sponge and requires that the following definition be read: “The term ‘negligent’ or 
‘negligence’ as used in this [these] instruction[s] means the failure to use that degree of skill 
and learning ordinarily used under the same or similar circumstances by the members of 
defendant’s profession.”  Id.  A jury might reason that a surgeon who left a sponge would 
not be negligent in doing so if he or she possessed the usual skill and learning.  See id. 
63 For a good example of this type of evidence exculpating a defendant whose conduct 
was negligent, see A.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Bellingham Sch. Dist., 105 P.3d 400 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005) (noting many witnesses testified that defendant who unaccountably lost grip on a 
piñata bat, which injured plaintiff, was nevertheless highly safety-minded). 
64 See Terajima v. Torrance Mem’l Med. Ctr., No. B195298, 2008 WL 192650, at *2–6 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008) (holding that mistakes do not equate to negligence after evidence 
indicated and the defendant admitted many mistakes in treating plaintiff); Williamson v. 
Prida, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868 (Ct. App. 1999) (ruling negligence standard does not require 
“proper care” or the absence of errors).  An Oregon case stated the legal doctrine accurately 
by approving the following jury instruction in a case in which a physician removed the 
anesthesia tube from his aspiration-prone patient in a way that caused the patient to aspirate 
his stomach contents:  “A physician is liable for an error of judgment if the physician fails to 
act with reasonable skill and care in exercising that judgment.  A physician is not liable for 
an error of judgment if the physician acts with reasonable care and skill in exercising such 
judgment.”  Rogers v. Meridian Park Hosp., 763 P.2d 400, 401 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding 
jury verdict for physician). 
65 See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 128. 
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judges are extremely reluctant to enter judgment as a matter of law for 
plaintiffs.  Such cases do exist in various states, but they are rare. 
It would be easier to see this asymmetry in breach of duty cases if 
casebooks were compiled differently.  Torts casebook writers continue to 
be highly influenced by Holmes’s theory of breach of duty even as they 
fully recognize that an important part of it did not play out.  Therefore, 
when we read a Torts casebook, we often see Holmes’s theory validated, 
as it were, by legerdemain.  The main method is to include in the breach 
of duty chapter several admiralty cases and Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) cases interlaced with common-law cases.  Admiralty and FTCA 
cases are ineligible for jury trial but are instead tried to judges.  When the 
breach of duty issue is always tried to judges, they develop a legal 
standard of the type that would exist more generally if U.S. courts had 
followed Holmes’s recommendation.  A good example is the casebook 
standard, The T.J. Hooper,66 one of many admiralty cases decided as a 
matter of law for the plaintiff.  It is highly misleading to include judge-
tried admiralty and FTCA cases as examples of a rule that is supposedly 
applicable equally to jury-eligible common-law cases.  In fact, the rules for 
the common-law cases are quite different, as the following discussion will 
explore. 
C. The Reality of Negligence Litigation 
The real law of negligence is quite different from Holmes’s theory and 
was different even before Holmes wrote.  It is asymmetrical in that courts 
are quite willing to declare no breach of duty as a matter of law but highly 
unwilling to establish the opposite, that is, breach of duty as a matter of 
law.  At precaution levels below the obviously adequate, juries possess 
almost total discretion to find liability or not, and in this large zone there 
is much inconsistency of decision that the courts wink at.  This is perhaps 
not the most obvious type of asymmetry, and possibly for this reason it 
has been little remarked.  It is, however, the most important feature of 
negligence law.  Courts police the negligence claims brought to them and 
weed out the cases of unavoidable accident or non-negligently caused 
                                                 
66 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (defendant committed breach of duty as 
a matter of law when it failed to equip its tugboats with radio receiving sets).  Two other 
admiralty cases that are often included in casebooks are United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
159 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding Conners Co. liable as a matter of law for failing to 
have a bargee on board on the day of the accident), and Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 203 (6th 
Cir. 1933) (granting judgment for defendant as matter of law because he was reasonably 
ignorant of the customs of the sea).  The T.J. Hooper and Carroll Towing are much more 
misleading for an understanding of common-law negligence doctrine because judgments of 
nonliability as a matter of law, as in Smith v. Lampe, are equally usual in common-law cases.  
See, e.g., discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B (discussing Carroll Towing). 
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harm.  It is as if courts believe that their most important role is to avoid 
creating incentives to overprecaution. 
Whenever a plaintiff brings a negligence case, he or she will allege an 
“accident signature,” a description that suggests in varying degrees that 
the defendant may have been negligently responsible.  It has long been 
true that some alleged accident signatures by themselves can create a prima 
facie case that will take the plaintiff’s case to a jury unless some further 
undisputed assertion is made by the defendant.  Examples of these “prima 
facie accident signatures,” in historical order, are:  (1) the defendant’s 
stagecoach suddenly crashed because its axle broke, and the plaintiff, a 
passenger, was thrown from it and was hurt;67 (2) the defendant’s hayrick 
spontaneously combusted, and the fire spread to the plaintiff’s nearby 
cottages and destroyed them;68 (3) one of the defendant’s pipes burst, 
flooding the plaintiff’s premises;69 (4) a barrel fell from the second-story 
loading bay of the defendant’s warehouse and struck the plaintiff, a 
pedestrian on the sidewalk below;70 and (5) the defendant surgeon 
inadvertently failed to remove a surgical sponge from the plaintiff’s body, 
which resulted in injury to the plaintiff.71 
Simply because the accident signature creates a prima facie case does 
not mean that the plaintiff will win.  For three different reasons, the 
plaintiff may still lose.  First, before evidence is taken the defendant may 
allege or prove undisputed new matter that destroys the prima facie case 
made out by the accident signature.  For instance, in the falling barrel case, 
if the plaintiff introduced undisputed evidence that the barrel fell because 
of a large earthquake that occurred at the same time as the accident, that 
new matter would prevent the case from getting to trial.72  Second, the 
defendant may prove to the satisfaction of a court, either the court trying 
the case or an appellate court, that the defendant’s conduct was not 
objectively negligent.  That was the situation in the bursting fire hydrant 
case in which the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the appellate 
court subsequently found that no reasonable precaution had been omitted 
because at the time it was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that 
                                                 
67 Christie v. Griggs (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1088; 2 Camp. 79.  
68 Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490; 7 Car. & P. 525. 
69 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047; 11 Exch. 781. 
70 Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299; 2 H. & C. 722. 
71 Akridge v. Noble, 41 S.E. 78, 78 (Ga. 1902). 
72 Cf. Hutchinson v. Boston Gaslight Co., 122 Mass. 219, 220, 1877 WL 10122 (1877) 
(holding that evidence showing that defendant's gas main leaked and exploded, injuring 
plaintiff, during Boston's Great Fire of 1872 failed to make out a prima facie case of 
negligence).  But see Fullerton v. Glens Falls Gas & Elec. Light Co., 141 N.Y.S. 838 (App. Div. 
1913) (holding that plaintiff’s showing that defendant's gas main leaked during a normal 
time and killed plaintiff's trees made out a prima facie case of negligence). 
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its hydrant system could fail because of frost.73  Third, a jury may find that 
the defendant was not negligent.  This was the situation in the case in 
which the surgeon closed the plaintiff before retrieving all the sponges.74  
In approving this verdict and the judgment entered on it, the appellate 
court stressed that the jury was entitled to find the defendant not guilty.75  
No evidence had been introduced suggesting that the defendant might 
have some objective excuse or justification for his substandard conduct in 
this case.  Another surgeon testified that it was very difficult to find 
sponges in a patient’s body, but that would not prevent the surgeon from 
counting the sponges in and out.  The defendant himself maintained that 
he had diligently checked for sponges before closing the patient and 
believed that he had retrieved all of them.76 
These few cases explain a deep truth about the negligence rule.  It is 
not one rule but simultaneously two.  For purposes of deciding whether 
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the standard of care is 
objectively defined in terms of conduct.  In Holmes’s words, the question 
is whether the defendant’s conduct was on one side of the objectively 
defined due care line or not.  Nevertheless, if the defendant’s conduct was 
objectively substandard, juries still possess the power in a wide range of 
cases to find for the defendant.  What to say about these jury acquittals of 
defendants who have obviously engaged in substandard conduct?  (1) We 
could say that these affirmed defense verdicts represent a subjective side 
of the negligence rule; or (2) we could think that juries that have acquitted 
a defendant’s substandard conduct have “nullified” the true negligence 
rule.  Rather than accept either of these propositions, it is more accurate, 
and certainly more parsimonious, to conclude that juries possess the power 
to forgive negligence, not always, but in a wide range of cases.  There is no 
law of when forgiveness is warranted, only a widespread and judicially-
approved practice that would have appalled Holmes. 
Indeed, for centuries, juries have apparently possessed the power to 
forgive negligence.77  As J. H. Baker and others have recorded, post-
                                                 
73 See Blyth, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1049. 
74 See Akridge, 41 S.E. at 78. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 78–80. 
77 The great English legal historian J. H. Baker has written that the old rule of accidental 
trespass was probably fault-based and that a defendant would be considered guilty only if 
“he was to blame for it, first in the sense that he had caused it, and secondly in the sense that 
with reasonable care he could have avoided it.”  J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
HISTORY 459 (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter BAKER, INTRODUCTION].  Baker also added that there 
was no reason to believe that the trespass and trespass on the case entailed different 
standards of culpability.  He wrote, “There is no reason to suppose that the standard was 
any different for trespass and case, since in either case it was left to the jury to decide 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss3/2
2019] The American Negligence Rule 563 
verdict controls of the type exercised in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. 
became common in England starting in the fifteenth century.78  To the 
extent that earlier common-law courts possessed fewer and less-
developed ways to control jury absolutions of substandard conduct, it is 
possible that the modern liability rule is stricter than the classical rule. 
III.  THE LEARNED HAND FORMULA 
A. The False Academic Conception of the Learned Hand Formula’s Role 
Professor Henry T. Terry originally proposed that the cost-benefit 
analysis of conduct should be the rule of decision in negligence cases.79  
Sixty years later Richard Posner embraced Judge Learned Hand’s gloss of 
the breach of duty rule80 announced in the famous Carroll Towing case.81  
Posner asserted that both judges and juries actually used—or could be 
understood to use—the Learned Hand formula in all negligence cases.82  
This idea has been tremendously influential among legal economists and 
even legal philosophers, some of whom have also embraced the Learned 
Hand formula83 and variants of it.84  Under the sway of this scholarship, 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts has recently adopted the Learned Hand 
formula for all negligence cases, arguing that it is already the rule of 
                                                 
according to current notions of culpability.”  Id.  Baker also argued that there were a number 
of successful “accident” pleas in the fourteenth century, but he conceded: 
they all could be described as cases where the chain of causation was 
broken by a force outside the defendant’s control:  for instance, the 
forces of combustion and wind (in fire cases), the perversity of animals 
(in running-down cases), or the plaintiff’s own action (by moving in 
front of a horse, a moving dagger, or an arrow).   
Id. at 457. 
78 See id. at 97–101; Morris S. Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial:  Out of Sight, 
Out of Mind, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 267, 267 (1974); Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial 
Administration and the Development of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 35, 63 (1983). 
79 See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 52 (1915). 
80 See Posner, Theory of Negligence, supra note 10, at 38. 
81 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), rev’g Conners 
Marine Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 66 F. Supp. 396 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).  
82 In describing the formative Gilded Age negligence cases, Posner wrote:  “The jury's 
function was not limited to finding the facts; it was also responsible for deciding whether the 
facts found constituted negligence.  It was the jurors who applied, within certain broad limits 
set by the judge, the Hand formula.”  Posner, Theory of Negligence, supra note 10, at 51. 
83 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 J. L. & PHIL. 37, 37 
(1983) (arguing that the Learned Hand formula is consistent with Immanuel Kant’s 
corrective-justice philosophy). 
84 See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 653, 657 (2003) (arguing that courts and juries should refer to cost-benefit 
analysis and then require precaution a bit beyond what cost-benefit analysis requires). 
Grady: The American Negligence Rule
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
564 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
decision or should be.85  Because it would eliminate jury forgiveness of 
errors, this rule would be much harsher than the actual rule now in 
existence.86 
If the Learned Hand formula is the rule in all negligence cases, one 
puzzle is why negligence jury instructions do not refer to cost-benefit 
analysis.  As already noted, they continue to use the less precise 
“reasonable” or “prudent” person test first announced in Blyth v. 
Birmingham Waterworks.87  The mystery is compounded when we see that 
many courts give a Learned Hand formula instruction in products liability 
cases involving allegedly defective product designs.88  Courts know how 
to give cost-benefit jury instructions; they simply do not do so in ordinary 
negligence cases. 
B. The Learned Hand Formula as a Decision Rule for Triers of Fact 
In debates between legal philosophers and legal economists about the 
negligence rule, it has seldom been stressed that United States v. Carroll 
                                                 
85 The Restatement (Third) of Torts states: 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care 
under all the circumstances.  Primary factors to consider in ascertaining 
whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable 
likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable 
severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010).  The comments to this section cite to numerous cases and statutes that supposedly 
embrace the Learned Hand formula as the accepted rule of decision in negligence cases. 
86 If juries were required to use the Learned Hand formula in all cases, presumably they 
would have to convict every surgeon who left a sponge in a patient because, on a one-time 
basis, the burden of removing it would be less than the reduction in risk from doing so.  Such 
a rule would benefit members of the plaintiffs’ bar, who would win more cases, and perhaps 
even members of the defense bar, who might be able to litigate more cases.  It seems probable 
that some medical malpractice cases involving routine practitioner errors are not litigated 
under the current regime because of the high probability that a jury would forgive the error 
in question.  Defense lawyers could gain litigation fees from a less forgiving rule of decision.  
For instance, in all cases of retained foreign objects, it would become a litigable issue what 
the plaintiff’s damages were.  See, e.g., infra Part VII. 
87 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049; 11 Exch. 781. 
88 For instance, California Civil Jury Instructions (BAJI)—Civ. 9.00.5 (2018) provides in 
part: 
In determining whether the benefits of the design outweigh its risks, 
you should consider, among other things, the gravity of the danger 
posed by the design, the likelihood that the danger would cause 
damage, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternate design at the time 
of manufacture, the financial cost of an improved design, and the 
adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would 
result from an alternate design. 
Id.  Nothing like this instruction is recommended for a negligence case. 
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Towing Co. was an admiralty case.89  As mandated by admiralty law, no 
jury was involved.  The famous Learned Hand opinion found that the 
Conners Marine Company, the owner and lessor of the barge Anna C, was 
negligent as a matter of law for the absence of its bargee.  This liability was 
joint with that of two other admiralty defendants, the Grace Line and the 
Carroll Company.  The district judge had no difficulty finding the latter 
two defendants liable as a matter of law (the only kind of liability that 
exists in admiralty law) because of their compliance error in failing to tie 
secure knots that would have prevented the Anna C from breaking loose.90  
If the case had been tried under common law, a jury might have forgiven 
these two harried workers’ negligence. 
The issue for Judge Hand was whether the Conners Company was 
jointly liable (with the Grace Line and the Carroll Company) for the loss 
of its own barge and for the government cargo loaded aboard it.  In 
deciding that the Conners Company had also breached a duty, Judge 
Hand reconciled similar cases on the same specific subject, that is, when it 
was a breach of duty for a bargee to be absent from his barge.  Hand’s 
approach would have won Holmes’s approval because Hand adopted a 
highly precedential view of this question.  After analyzing the facts of 
twelve previously decided absent bargee cases,91 he then glossed their 
                                                 
89 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 170 (2d Cir. 1947), rev’g Conners 
Marine Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 66 F. Supp. 396 (E.D.N.Y. 1946). 
90 See id. at 174. 
91 Judge Hand’s analysis of the precedent bearing on whether a bargee’s absence 
constitutes a breach of duty deserves full quotation because nothing like it exists in common-
law cases.  This was the type of analysis that Holmes envisioned for the common law, which 
under his recommendation would limit jury decisions (which, again, do not exist in 
admiralty cases): 
As to the consequences of a bargee’s absence from his barge there have 
been a number of decisions; and we cannot agree that it is never ground 
for liability even to other vessels who may be injured.  As early as 1843, 
Judge Sprague in Clapp v. Young, held a schooner liable which broke 
adrift from her moorings in a gale in Provincetown Harbor, and ran 
down another ship.  The ground was that the owners of the offending 
ship had left no one on board, even though it was the custom in that 
harbor not to do so.  Judge Tenney in Fenno v. The Mary E. Cuff, treated 
it as one of several faults against another vessel which was run down, 
to leave the offending vessel unattended in a storm in Port Jefferson 
Harbor.  Judge Thomas in The On-the-Level, held liable for damage to a 
stake-boat, a barge moored to the stake-boat “south of Liberty Light, off 
the Jersey shore,” because she had been left without a bargee; indeed he 
declared that the bargee’s absence was “gross negligence.”  In the 
Kathryn B. Guinan, Ward, J., did indeed say that, when a barge was made 
fast to a pier in the harbor, as distinct from being in open waters, the 
bargee’s absence would not be the basis for the owner’s negligence.  
However, the facts in that case made no such holding necessary; the 
offending barge in fact had a bargee aboard though he was asleep.  In 
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the Beeko, Judge Campbell exonerated a power boat which had no 
watchman on board, which boys had maliciously cast loose from her 
moorings at the Marine Basin in Brooklyn and which collided with 
another vessel.  Obviously that decision has no bearing on the facts at 
bar.  In United States Trucking Corporation v. City of New York, the same 
judge refused to reduce the recovery of a coal hoister, injured at a foul 
berth, because the engineer was not on board; he had gone home for the 
night as was apparently his custom.  We reversed the decree, but for 
another reason.  In The Sadie, we affirmed Judge Coleman’s holding that 
it was actionable negligence to leave without a bargee on board a barge 
made fast outside another barge, in the face of storm warnings.  The 
damage was done to the inside barge.  In The P. R. R. No. 216, we charged 
with liability a lighter which broke loose from, or was cast off, by a 
tanker to which she was moored, on the ground that her bargee should 
not have left her over Sunday.  He could not know when the tanker 
might have to cast her off.  We carried this so far in The East Indian, as to 
hold a lighter whose bargee went ashore for breakfast, during which the 
stevedores cast off some of the lighter’s lines.  True, the bargee came 
back after she was free and was then ineffectual in taking control of her 
before she damaged another vessel; but we held his absence itself a fault, 
knowing as he must have, that the stevedores were apt to cast off the 
lighter.  The Conway No. 23 went on the theory that the absence of the 
bargee had no connection with the damage done to the vessel itself; it 
assumed liability, if the contrary had been proved.  In The Trenton, we 
refused to hold a moored vessel because another outside of her had 
overcharged her fasts.  The bargee had gone away for the night when a 
storm arose; and our exoneration of the offending vessel did depend 
upon the theory that it was not negligent for the bargee to be away for 
the night; but no danger was apparently then to be apprehended.  In 
Bouker Contracting Co. v. Williamsburgh Power Plant Corporation, we 
charged a scow with half damages because her bargee left her without 
adequate precautions.  In O’Donnell Transportation Co. v. M. & J. Tracy, 
we refused to charge a barge whose bargee had been absent from 9 A.M. 
to 1:30 P.M., having “left the vessel to go ashore for a time on his own 
business.” 
Id. at 172–73 (footnotes omitted).  Judge Hand concluded this precedential analysis by 
declaring as follows: 
It appears from the foregoing review that there is no general rule to 
determine when the absence of a bargee or other attendant will make 
the owner of the barge liable for injuries to other vessels if she breaks 
away from her moorings.  However, in any cases where he would be so 
liable for injuries to others obviously he must reduce his damages 
proportionately, if the injury is to his own barge.  It becomes apparent 
why there can be no such general rule, when we consider the grounds 
for such a liability.  Since there are occasions when every vessel will 
break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace 
to those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to 
provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables:  (1) The 
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting 
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.  Possibly it 
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms:  if the 
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends 
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legal doctrine with his famous formula.  His approach instantiates what 
we would see more generally if common-law courts had adopted, rather 
than rejected, Holmes’s recommendation of a precedential standard of 
due care.  Nevertheless, if the issue of the absent bargee had come before 
a common-law court and the jury had forgiven his absence, a common-
law court would have affirmed that acquittal.  If a jury can acquit a 
surgeon who has left a scalpel in a patient, it can equally acquit an 
attendant who has left a barge.  Carroll Towing would have been decided 
differently under those circumstances. 
Many textbook and casebook authors have assumed that the 
negligence rule is much the same whether a case arises under the common 
law of negligence, where in the U.S. a jury is involved, or under a statute 
or body of law in which judges decide cases without juries.  The principal 
examples are admiralty cases that involve collisions between ships and 
FTCA cases, which involve accidents caused by the federal government’s 
negligence.  In these systems there can be no jury forgiveness of errors 
because juries are not involved.  In these cases, the breach of duty standard 
                                                 
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P:  i.e., whether B < PL.  
Applied to the situation at bar, the likelihood that a barge will break 
from her fasts and the damage she will do, vary with the place and time; 
for example, if a storm threatens, the danger is greater; so it is, if she is 
in a crowded harbor where moored barges are constantly being shifted 
about.  On the other hand, the barge must not be the bargee’s prison, 
even though he lives aboard; he must go ashore at times.  We need not 
say whether, even in such crowded waters as New York Harbor a bargee 
must be aboard at night at all; it may be that the custom is otherwise, as 
Ward, J., supposed in “The Kathryn B. Guinan,” supra; and that, if so, 
the situation is one where custom should control.  We leave that 
question open; but we hold that it is not in all cases a sufficient answer 
to a bargee’s absence without excuse, during working hours, that he has 
properly made fast his barge to a pier, when he leaves her.  In the case 
at bar the bargee left at five o’clock in the afternoon of January 3rd, and 
the flotilla broke away at about two o’clock in the afternoon of the 
following day, twenty-one hours afterwards.  The bargee had been 
away all the time, and we hold that his fabricated story was affirmative 
evidence that he had no excuse for his absence.  At the locus in quo—
especially during the short January days and in the full tide of war 
activity—barges were being constantly “drilled” in and out.  Certainly 
it was not beyond reasonable expectation that, with the inevitable haste 
and bustle, the work might not be done with adequate care.  In such 
circumstances we hold—and it is all that we do hold—that it was a fair 
requirement that the Conners Company should have a bargee aboard 
(unless he had some excuse for his absence), during the working hours 
of daylight. 
Id. at 173–74 (footnotes omitted).  Judge Hand offered his Learned Hand formula as a “general rule” 
for absent bargee cases, but he phrased it so generally that it is obvious he thought it applied 
beyond that context.  Id. at 173. 
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is much more objective and much more symmetrical.  When a federal 
government surgeon leaves a foreign object in his patient, and there is no 
issue of whether the damages were caused by the lapse, the case results in 
judgment as a matter of law for the patient.92  Similarly, judges in FTCA 
cases based on misfilled prescriptions routinely order judgment as a 
matter of law for plaintiffs when the damages were caused by error.93  
These same cases often result in jury forgiveness when they are tried 
through the ordinary negligence common-law process.94 
                                                 
92 See Vines v. United States, No. 2:05-cv-02370-FCD-GGH, 2008 WL 4470795, at *4–5 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 2, 2008) (holding judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff on breach of duty issue 
against surgeon who inadvertently left “small wire” in patient’s back); Gills v. United States, 
No. 7:08-cv-00245, 2010 WL 1444590, at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 2010) (finding negligence as a 
matter of law for leaving sponge in patient, but plaintiff unable to prove sponge was cause 
in fact of death); Kellar v. U.S. Dep’t Veteran’s Affairs, No. 08-cv-00761-WYD-KLM, 2010 WL 
3785569, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 2010) (determining breach of duty as a matter of law for 
leaving metal clamp in patient’s chest).  See also McCubbin v. Hastings, 27 La. Ann. 713, 719 
(1875) (ordering judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff who sued pharmacist for 
dispensing error when case had been tried to judge); Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, 949–
50 (E.D. Va. 1960) (ordering judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff in diversity case where 
surgeon had left small sponge in patient).  Cf. Prindle v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-054-A, 
2011 WL 1869795, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2011) (opining judgment as a matter of law 
would be given for plaintiff in FTCA case in which plaintiff suffered damage from surgeon 
leaving a foreign object in his body).  But see Callahan v. Cho, 437 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565 (E.D. 
Va. 2006) (requiring FTCA plaintiff to comply with West Virginia malpractice reform statute, 
which required expert statement to create triable issue of fact, in a case where the Veterans 
Administration surgeon left small needle tip in his body because it could not be easily 
removed). 
93 See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 382 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.) (entitling 
plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law in FTCA case when Navy hospital pharmacy 
dispensed twice the recommended dose to her decedent); Boyle v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 
2d 570, 570 (D.S.C. 2012) (ruling for plaintiff in FTCA case after Navy pharmacist accidently 
dispensed ten times prescribed dose to plaintiffs’ deceased); Boyle v. United States, 948 F. 
Supp. 2d 577, 584 (D.S.C. 2012) (providing separate order for damages in previous case); 
Espinosa v. United States, No. 00 C 3435, 2001 WL 1518536, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2001) 
(determining, in FTCA case, that Veterans Administration pharmacist committed breach of 
duty as a matter of law, by filling prescription with incorrect dose of drug, but also holding 
incorrect dose was not cause in fact of injury), aff’d, 47 F. App’x 402, 405, 2002 WL 31027954 
(7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2002). 
94 See infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS THE MAIN CONSTRAINT ON JURIES’ BREACH 
OF DUTY DETERMINATIONS 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Ground for Judgment as a Matter of Law for the 
Defendant 
Many commentators have noticed that cost-benefit analysis and the 
Learned Hand formula are absent in negligence jury instructions.95  They 
have sometimes inferred that both are irrelevant to the common law of 
negligence.  That is incorrect.  It is true that in negligence cases judges do 
not ask juries to do cost-benefit analysis, but cost-benefit analysis is still 
the most important general principle defining common-law breach of 
duty.  The true role of cost-benefit analysis in jury-eligible cases is not to 
be the jury’s decision rule but to be applied by judges to limit the cases in 
which juries can find negligence liability.  Juries are indeed allowed to 
forgive the nonuse of a cost-beneficial precaution, but they are not 
permitted to require the use of precautions beyond the balance of cost-
benefit analysis.  This is undoubtedly a very permissive standard, and we 
will explore at the end of this Article what has probably caused the courts 
to adopt it. 
As just noted, however, the most important ways in which courts use 
cost-benefit analysis are to dismiss a case before trial and to reject a jury 
verdict that reflects the jury’s view that the defendant should have used 
precaution beyond the demands of cost-benefit analysis.  From a very 
early point in the history of the modern negligence rule, courts—and 
therefore litigants—have focused on specific untaken precautions.96 
Many grounds for a defense summary judgment exist.  These include 
the absence of a duty by the defendant, the absence of proximate cause, 
                                                 
95 See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1016–18 (1994); 
Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency:  Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1630–31 
(1997); Patrick J. Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law, 45 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 757 (2001); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence:  Hand Formula 
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (2001); 
Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries about Negligence:  A Review of 
Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 618–19 (2002); Richard W. Wright, Hand, 
Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula," 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 151–52, 161–62 
(2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2005–06 (2007); 
Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs:  A Closer Look at the 
Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1222 (2008). 
96 See, e.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1047–49; 11 
Exch. 780 (holding that cleaning frost off a fire plug was not required, despite jury verdict to 
contrary, because no experience demonstrated that the precaution was useful); Crafter v. 
Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1866) 1 LRCP 300, 301–05 (Eng.) (finding, despite a jury verdict to the 
contrary, that defendant was not required to install handrail on staircase, replace the worn-
out brass nosing on the staircase, or install nosing made of more durable material than brass). 
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the presence of assumption of the risk, and so forth.  Especially in the 
modern era, courts are not totally consistent in how they characterize 
factual issues and how they sort them among the elements of negligence, 
which are usually taken to be duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate 
cause, and actual harm.  Nevertheless, courts almost always give reasons 
for their conclusion of no liability as a matter of law, and the reason in 
which we are interested is whether the defendant used adequate 
precaution in the situation that led to the plaintiff’s harm. 
In cases in which courts concern themselves with the adequacy of the 
defendant’s precautions to assess whether the defendant deserved 
judgment as a matter of law, the most common grounds for this 
conclusion are:  (1) the burden of additional precautions was outweighed 
by the reduction in risk that would have been produced by them; (2) the 
risk that harmed the plaintiff was “unforeseeable,” which in this context 
usually means very small from an ex ante point of view; (3) the plaintiff 
failed to identify an untaken precaution or other fault by the defendant in 
a case in which res ipsa was unavailable; (4) the risk that harmed the 
plaintiff was “obvious” to the plaintiff; (5) the undisputed facts showed 
that the defendant used due care; (6) expert evidence was required to 
show breach of duty, and it was absent on the record; and (7) the 
defendant’s act that caused the harm was involuntary.  The first of these 
grounds for summary judgment invokes cost-benefit analysis and the 
Learned Hand formula, but especially given the usual context of analysis 
under each of these seven heads, all can be understood as suggesting the 
court’s conclusion that no precaution untaken by the defendant would 
have paid out its costs in terms of reduced ex ante risk. 
1. The Burden of Additional Precautions was Outweighed by the 
Reduction in Risk that Would Have Been Produced by Them 
For a court to conclude that the burden of additional precautions was 
greater than the reduction in ex ante risk entails cost-benefit analysis.  This 
type of analysis is more prominent in older cases.  Nevertheless, modern 
cases seem to adopt the same cost-benefit perspective even when they are 
less explicit about it.  The reader will be able to judge the validity of this 
point from the following discussion. 
Adams v. Bullock97 was a famous case that used the Learned Hand 
formula’s reasoning well before the formula existed.  The case was 
decided by Judge Cardozo in 1919 and concerned a young plaintiff who 
sued the defendant for injuries he sustained when a wire that he was 
swinging came into contact with the defendant’s trolley wires. 
                                                 
97 Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93–94 (N.Y. 1919). 
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The defendant ran a trolley line in the city of Dunkirk, New York, 
employing an overhead wire system.  At one point, the road was crossed 
by a bridge that carried the tracks of the Nickel Plate and Pennsylvania 
railroads.  Pedestrians often used the bridge as a shortcut between streets, 
and children played on it.  On April 21, 1916, the plaintiff, a twelve-year-
old boy, came across the bridge, swinging an eight-foot wire.  In swinging 
it, he hit the defendant’s trolley wire, which ran beneath the structure.  The 
side of the bridge was protected by a parapet eighteen inches wide.  The 
trolley wire was strung four feet, seven and three-fourths inches below the 
top of the parapet.  The plaintiff was shocked and burned when the wires 
came together.98  The trial court sent the case to the jury, which returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff.  The defendant appealed arguing that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. 
The Court of Appeals of New York held for the defendant, finding 
insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s verdict.99  In rejecting 
liability, Judge Cardozo performed a cost-benefit analysis based on the 
low probability of the accident, given the precautions the defendant had 
already taken, and the impracticality of guarding the wires.  He stressed 
that the trolley wires needed to be uninsulated to power the trolleys and 
that guards would be very costly because the actual location of the 
accident was not that much more likely than anyplace else along the 
trolley line.  Given the low probability of any accident of the type that 
occurred, the potential reduction in risk from any further precaution 
would be small relative to the large cost of guarding the trolley wires 
throughout the system.100  Therefore, the jury verdict of liability could not 
be accepted. 
                                                 
98 Id. at 93. 
99 Id. 
100 See id.  Cardozo wrote: 
The trolley wire was so placed that no one standing on the bridge or 
even bending over the parapet could reach it.  Only some extraordinary 
casualty, not fairly within the area of ordinary prevision, could make it 
a thing of danger.  Reasonable care in the use of a destructive agency 
imports a high degree of vigilance (Nelson v. Branford L. & W. Co., 75 
Conn. 548, 551; Braun v. Buffalo Gen. El. Co., 200 N.Y. 484).  But no 
vigilance, however alert, unless fortified by the gift of prophecy, could 
have predicted the point upon the route where such an accident would 
occur.  It might with equal reason have been expected anywhere else.  
At any point upon the route, a mischievous or thoughtless boy might 
touch the wire with a metal pole, or fling another wire across it (Green 
v. W.P. Rys. Co., 246 Penn. St. 340).  If unable to reach it from the walk, 
he might stand upon a wagon or climb upon a tree.  No special danger 
at this bridge warned the defendant that there was need of special 
measures of precaution.  No like accident had occurred before.  No 
Grady: The American Negligence Rule
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
572 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
Cooley v. Public Service Co.101 was a similar case that also used the 
objective standard of cost-benefit analysis to reject the plaintiff’s alleged 
untaken durable precautions.  The plaintiff suffered trauma from a loud 
noise that came over her telephone line; the most immediate cause was a 
power company’s high voltage line breaking in a storm and making 
contact with the telephone wire over which the plaintiff was speaking.  
She sued both the electric company and the power company.  The plaintiff 
suggested two durable precautions as untaken and as alternatively 
constituting both defendants’ breach of duty:  (1) the power company’s 
failure to insulate its power wires; and (2) both defendants’ failure to place 
a mesh basket underneath the power wires at places where they were 
close to the telephone wires so that if the power wires broke they would 
not touch the adjacent telephone wire.102  The jury returned a verdict for 
the telephone company, but against the power company, which appealed 
based on insufficiency of the evidence of breach of duty. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected both untaken 
precautions under a cost-benefit analysis.103  The court reasoned, based on 
the evidence, that both precautions would have increased the risk of 
electrocution to pedestrians underneath the power lines by keeping the 
lines live after they had been breached, increasing the likelihood that a 
pedestrian would become the ground that would break the circuit and cut 
off the electricity.  Because the increased risk of electrocution would have 
been greater than the reduction in the risk from noise trauma, neither 
precaution was cost-beneficial and was therefore rejected.104  The court 
                                                 
custom had been disregarded.  We think that ordinary caution did not 
involve forethought of this extraordinary peril. 
Id.  Cardozo also said: 
There is, we may add, a distinction not to be ignored between electric 
light and trolley wires.  The distinction is that the former may be 
insulated.  Chance of harm, though remote, may betoken negligence, if 
needless.  Facility of protection may impose a duty to protect.  With 
trolley wires, the case is different.  Insulation is impossible. 
Id. 
101 Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940). 
102 Id. at 674–75. 
103 See id. at 673. 
104 Id. at 677.  The court said: 
In the case before us, there was danger of electrocution in the street.  As 
long as the Telephone Company’s safety devices are properly installed 
and maintained, there is no danger of electrocution in the house.  The 
only foreseeable danger to the telephone subscriber is from noise-fright 
and neurosis.  Balancing the two, the danger to those such as the plaintiff 
is remote, that to those on the ground near the broken wires is obvious 
and immediate. The balance would not be improved by taking a chance 
to avoid traumatic neurosis of the plaintiff at the expense of greater risk 
to the lives of others.  
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stressed that some cost-beneficial untaken precaution might have existed, 
but it was the plaintiff’s burden to offer and prove it.  Again, the jury 
verdict of negligence could not be accepted. 
The Cooley case is interesting from at least two points of view.  First, 
the court used a more sophisticated economic analysis of breach of duty 
than Judge Hand when he announced his formula seven years later.  The 
Cooley court understood the cost of precaution in its full economic sense, 
which is the “opportunity cost.”  The cost of a precaution, or of anything, 
is value forgone by having it.  The value forgone by mesh baskets is not 
just their expense but also, and mainly, the lives that would be lost from 
electrocution if the mesh baskets were installed, just as the court reasoned.  
Second, Cooley seems in tension with at least some corrective justice 
theories of tort.  The Cooley decision required the power company to use 
telephone subscribers as a means of providing benefits for pedestrians.  
Immanuel Kant would be concerned about this aspect of the case because 
he argued that one’s first duty is to treat other humans as ends only and 
not as means to improve others’ welfare. 
Beginning in the last century, some courts have begun to develop a 
precedential standard of breach of duty.  This is not the comprehensive 
standard that Holmes envisioned but instead a standard that gives 
guidance to courts about when it is proper for courts to order judgment as 
a matter of law for a defendant.  Again, Holmes argued that courts should 
develop a precedential standard of breach of duty that would define three 
different zones for various accident types:  (1) a zone in which judgment 
as a matter of law for the plaintiff was proper; (2) an ever-shrinking 
intermediate zone in which a jury would be permitted to find either for 
the plaintiff or the defendant; and (3) a zone in which precedent would 
indicate that judgment as a matter of law for the defendant is proper.105  
The relatively modern development concerns only the third zone.  Thus, 
this body of law sets an upper limit for precaution requirements that juries 
may enforce.  California, long known for its progressive jurisprudence, is 
a good example. 
The most recent origin of California’s limits on jury-established 
precaution requirements comes from the 1968 case of Rowland v. 
Christian,106 which expanded duties of care in the context of premises 
liability.  This case recited a list of “policy factors” that should be 
considered in deciding the negligence issue of “duty.”107  In its original 
                                                 
Id. at 676. 
105 See generally HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2.  
106 See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
107 See id. at 567.  The court said: 
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use, the Rowland court used the policy list to reject a categorical rule of 
duty, namely, that apartment renters owe a very limited duty to their 
social guests.  The Rowland v. Christian court replaced this rule with the 
policy list, thus expanding the realm in which juries could hold land 
occupiers liable to their social guests.  Since Rowland v. Christian was 
decided in 1968, courts have used the policy list announced in that case to 
create semi-categorical rules that limit juries’ powers to find negligence in 
different situations, virtually the opposite of the list’s original use.  In this 
modern use of the Rowland list, the two most important policy factors have 
been “the foreseeability of the harm” and “the extent of the burden to the 
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to 
exercise care.”  These two elements are the main components of Judge 
Hand’s cost-benefit analysis in Carroll Towing. 
As later California Supreme Court cases have recognized,108 Nevarez 
v. Thriftimart, Inc.,109 was one of the first cases in this new line defining 
limited “duties” based on cost-benefit considerations.  The three-year-old 
plaintiff lived with his family directly across from a large shopping center 
at which the defendant held a grand opening of its new supermarket.  As 
a part of the celebration, the defendant hired carnival rides, such as a 
Tinkertown train, a merry-go-round, and a Ferris wheel, and also gave 
away free treats, such as ice cream and popcorn.  The plaintiff, supervised 
by his grandmother, attended the festival the morning of the accident.  The 
group returned for lunch, and in the early afternoon the plaintiff escaped 
his minders to get back to the fun and jaywalked across the street dividing 
his home and the shopping center.  A speeding car struck him 
immediately as he dashed out between two parked cars.110  He sued both 
the driver who struck him and the supermarket, and the jury returned a 
verdict against both for negligence.111  The reported case arose on the 
                                                 
A departure from this fundamental principle [that, supposedly, 
everyone always owes a duty whenever his or her precaution could 
foreseeably reduce risk] involves the balancing of a number of 
considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the 
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, 
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to 
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, 
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  
Id. at 564. 
108 See, e.g., Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1200–01 (Cal. 2017) 
(discussing Nevarez in a similar case). 
109 See Nevarez v. Thriftman, 87 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Ct. App. 1970). 
110 See id. at 51–52. 
111 Id. at 51. 
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supermarket’s motion for judgment n.o.v.  On the appeal, the plaintiff 
analogized to then-recent cases in which roving ice cream and donut 
sellers were held liable for failing to protect the young customers they 
sought to attract.  The Nevarez court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff 
against the supermarket because it owed no “duty.”  The court said that 
the burden of controlling the entire perimeter of a shopping center was 
much greater and less practical than the burden of controlling the 
relatively small area surrounding an ice cream truck.112  Once again, a 
jury’s verdict could not be accepted because the alleged untaken 
precaution exceeded the requirements of cost-benefit analysis. 
The traditional idea is that negligence duties are defined by very 
general considerations such as whether the defendant committed an 
affirmative act, whether there was an undertaking, whether a special 
relationship existed between the parties, and so forth.  Breach of duty, on 
the other hand, depends on “fact-specific” considerations such as whether 
under the detailed circumstances of the accident the defendant used 
sufficient precaution.  The Nevarez court’s analysis straddled these two 
levels.  On the one hand, the court seemed to lay down a general rule 
finding no duty for stationary vendors that attracted children; on the other 
hand, the court based this conclusion on the cost-benefit considerations 
that are more traditional in breach of duty determinations.  Still, the 
Nevarez court’s holding made good sense as a duty rule because it was 
fairly categorical.  Subsequent California cases have obliterated the 
categorical approach. 
A good example of the latter type of case is Parsons v. Crown Disposal 
Co.113  The defendant’s trash collector clamorously emptied his bin near 
the Griffith Park Equestrian Trail when plaintiff was nearby on his horse.  
The driver could not easily see plaintiff behind his truck.  When the bin 
emptied, the horse bolted and threw the plaintiff, causing the injuries for 
                                                 
112 See id. at 51.  The Nevarez court’s specific language was as follows: 
To impose a duty of care of the nature contended for by respondent 
would be to place an unjustifiable burden upon any businessman whose 
store displays toys or other things attractive to children.  Indeed, since 
small children are notoriously curious about and attracted to anything 
and everything, the limits to such a duty, if imposed, are not readily 
visible.  Retail establishment would be cast in the role of a modern-day 
Pied Piper and, as such, obligated to act as parent or babysitter for every 
tot in the neighborhood who might decide to dash across a public street 
in order to bask in the store's allure.  The attractions offered by appellant 
and the generalized invitation to enjoy them, thus do not analogize to 
the conduct of a street vendor.  
Id. at 54. 
113 Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1997). 
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which he sued.114  This case would have been different if defendant had 
seen plaintiff because then the burden was relatively low to delay lift.  
Untaken precautions suggested by plaintiff were very burdensome.  These 
included changing the hours of collection, temporarily blocking off the 
trash collection zone with warning signs, and providing collection 
schedules to equestrians.115  The trial court granted summary judgment to 
defendant, which was affirmed by the California Supreme Court.116  The 
California Supreme Court basically performed a Learned Hand formula 
analysis, stressing that it would be too great a burden to use any of the 
precautions that the plaintiff alleged as untaken.117 
Although in this case there was “no duty,” the court made clear that 
if the trash truck driver had seen the equestrian and his horse before 
dumping the load, the case would have been decided differently because 
then the burden of merely delaying the dump into the truck would have 
been low.  Thus, although the purported rule related to “duty,” it was not 
very categorical.  The case basically held that failing to look for skittish 
horses could not be a breach of duty under the detailed circumstances of 
the case because that untaken precaution, and the others alleged by the 
plaintiff, flunked the Learned Hand formula. 
2. The Risk that Harmed the Plaintiff was “Unforeseeable,” which in this 
Context Usually Means Very Small from an Ex Ante Point of View 
Under the Learned Hand formula and cost-benefit analysis more 
generally, the relevant question is whether some untaken precaution 
would have cost less than the risk it would have eliminated.  In this 
context, the risk eliminated is inevitably estimated from an ex ante point 
of view as of a time before the accident when the untaken precaution could 
have been adopted.  It follows that if, as of that time, no risk was 
foreseeable from failing to adopt the precaution, then no breach of duty 
can be based on the untaken precaution in question.  Thus, judicial 
assertions that the risk was “unforeseeable” can be sensibly understood as 
a truncated form of cost-benefit analysis.  Recall that the purpose of this 
analysis arises in some sort of summary adjudication or review of the 
evidence presented at trial to ensure that a jury does not exceed the 
requirements of cost-benefit analysis. 
                                                 
114 Id. at 71. 
115 Id. at 81. 
116 Id. at 94. 
117 Id. at 81. 
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A good example of this analysis is found in Blyth v. Birmingham 
Waterworks Co. (1856).118  The defendant could have seen frosted plugs on 
its fire hydrant system as a danger sign because, if the plugs were frozen 
shut when the water around the plugs froze, the expanding ice could 
break the pipes.119  If the defendant’s employees had simply cleaned the 
frost off the stoppers, the accident would have been prevented because the 
stoppers would have been able to move forward in their iron tubes, which 
would have relieved the pressure of the expanding ice and prevented the 
bursting of the pipes and the plaintiff’s damage.  Although the untaken 
precaution was cheap, the court found it was not required because the 
defendant’s employees had no practical way of foreseeing the probable 
consequences of their omitted precaution.120  The cold spell of 1855 was 
unprecedented, so the water company employees reasonably lacked the 
knowledge that cleaning the plugs would have reduced any significant 
risk to those living close to the pipes.121  There are many similar cases that 
have prevented juries from finding liability, just as in Blyth.122 
                                                 
118 The defendant had installed an early fire hydrant system that entailed punching fire 
plugs in its subterranean wooden water pipes.  In 1855, when the system was still relatively 
new, the weather in England turned extraordinarily frigid, and the stoppers on the plugs 
frosted over.  See Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1047–49; 
11 Exch. 781.   
 In this case, the court defined negligence in the highly objective way of which Holmes 
approved.  One hundred and sixty years later this text from the opinion is still a common 
jury instruction in the United States: 
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, 
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the 
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a 
prudent and reasonable man would not do.  The defendants might have 
been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that 
which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person 
taking reasonable precautions would not have done. 
Id. at 1049. 
119 That is what happened in the actual case, and a large quantity of water leaked from the 
municipal pipes into the basement of the plaintiff who sued for negligence.  Id. at 1047–49. 
120 Id. at 1049. 
121 See id.  A hydraulic engineer would have possessed this knowledge, but the employees 
were not chargeable with this degree of expertise.  Id. at 1049. 
122 See Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, J.) 
(holding that defendant’s employee did not need to pre-announce changes in position 
because plaintiff should have looked where she was walking; risk from failure of employee 
to pre-announce was “unforeseeable”); Collins v. Noss, 15 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (App. Div. 1939) 
(holding that a risk that anyone would be hurt by small floor defect was “unforeseeable”); 
Danielenko v. Kinney Rent A Car, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1073, 1075–76 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that 
risk to rental company that its car would contain bomb planted by saboteur was “not 
foreseeable”); Moeske v. Nalley, 744 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252–53 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that risk 
to plaintiff, who had unobviously jumped on defendant’s back bumper to assist in 
emergency, was “unforeseeable” to defendant); Pitre v. Empl’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 234 
So. 2d 847, 853 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (finding risk that plaintiff’s decedent would be hurt by 
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3. The Plaintiff Failed to Identify an Untaken Precaution or Other Fault 
by the Defendant in a Case in which Res Ipsa was Unavailable 
The most traditional form of cost-benefit analysis examines the cost 
and benefit of a specific untaken precaution.123  When the plaintiff has 
alleged no untaken precaution, this analysis becomes impossible, and 
courts often nonsuit plaintiffs for this reason.124  A more basic reason for 
summary judgment for the defendant is when the plaintiff has failed 
unreasonably to identify any untaken precaution by the defendant that 
could have prevented the injury.125 
4. The Risk that Harmed the Plaintiff was “Obvious” to the Plaintiff  
Another common reason why defendants are granted summary 
judgment is when the hazard on the defendant’s premises was obvious.126  
                                                 
thrower’s windup at carnival baseball throw was “unforeseeable” and did not require special 
precautions); Birchfield v. Sweatt, No. F052443, 2008 WL 698925, at *5–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 
17, 2008) (finding risk of giving hair-trigger pistol to daughter to protect herself created 
“unforeseeable” risk that her boyfriend, trained as army sniper, would intentionally or 
accidentally shoot himself); Keith v. City of Pleasant Hill, No. A137044, 2013 WL 5569993, at 
*3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2013) (declaring that risk of injury from driving over hose stretched 
across street “unforeseeable”).  
123 Some modern forms of judicial cost-benefit analysis conclude that a whole range of 
precautions by the defendant were not socially worthwhile.  See, e.g., Vasilenko v. Grace 
Family Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1201–02 (Cal. 2017) (determining that landowner’s cost-
benefical precautions to prevent injury from invitees crossing a street from parking lot are 
limited and unproductive relative to their costs). 
124 See Zachlod v. Seymour Beacon Falls, LLC, No. AANCV156019053S, 2017 WL 6997255, 
at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2017) (holding that defendant was entitled to summary 
judgment when plaintiff submitted no substantial evidence of floor defect upon which she 
allegedly slipped or defendant’s untaken precaution); Morgan v. Nickowski, No. 334668, 
2017 WL 5759789, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017) (holding that defendant landlord was 
entitled to summary judgment when plaintiff submitted no evidence that he knew his 
tenants owned pit bulls that hurt plaintiff’s dog). 
125 See Rogers v. Santoro-Cotton, No. 1-17-0606, 2018 IL App. (1st) 170606-U, at *4 (Ill. App. 
Ct. Jan. 18, 2018) (holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment because 
plaintiff failed to identify any potentially negligent untaken precaution that was cause of 
plaintiff’s injury); Psillas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 66 S.W.3d 860, 863, 866 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2001) (ruling that defendant was entitled to summary judgment when plaintiffs failed 
unreasonably to identify the object that cut their son and what, if anything, the defendant 
could have done to prevent the accident when the immediate cause was older sister rocking 
the boy on a roll of carpeting offered for sale); Czarnecki v. Hagenow, 477 N.E.2d 964, 968 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (ordering that summary judgment was proper for defendant because 
plaintiff failed to identify defendant’s untaken precaution). 
126 See Rosen v. Bronx Hosp., 127 N.E.2d 82, 82 (N.Y. 1955) (finding judgment as matter of 
law for defendant when plaintiff stuck his fingers into hinge area of closing door); Armstrong 
v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 788 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ohio 2003) (holding that defendant retailer was 
entitled to summary judgment because bracket for store shopping-cart guardrail upon which 
plaintiff tripped was open and obvious). 
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The traditional rule was that an invitor’s liability to an invitee depended 
on the hazard being nonobvious.127  Usually cases finding judgment as a 
matter of law for the defendant on this ground involve small risks for 
which the efficient prevention is for the plaintiff to notice and avoid them.  
Another class of cases entails situations where the plaintiff voluntarily 
encountered a substantial and obvious risk out of recklessness. 
5. The Undisputed Facts on the Judgment Record Showed that the 
Defendant Used All Cost-Beneficial Precautions 
It was proper to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of a 
dangerous nightclub whose security personnel and uniformed law 
enforcement personnel, in a two-step process, patted down all customers 
for concealed weapons but failed to notice the weapon the plaintiff’s 
assailant was carrying.128  The court did not stress cost-benefit analysis but 
rather the substantiality of the elaborate and costly precautions that the 
defendant used.129  The court’s decision suggested that a defendant who 
establishes an elaborate and costly precaution plan should not be held 
liable for every lapse in it.  A contrary rule would punish investments in 
safety.  
Often a court’s conclusion that the defendant used cost-beneficial 
precaution follows from its judgment that the defendant lacked actual or 
constructive knowledge of the risk.130  These cases are basically the same 
as those entering judgment as a matter of law for the defendant on the 
ground that the risk was unforeseeable. 
                                                 
127 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his 
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the 
exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, 
and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, 
or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise 
reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  Subparagraph (b) is the 
“obviousness” requirement, which denies liability to an invitee for an “obvious” defect in 
the defendant’s land. 
128 See Yearwood v. Club Miami, Inc., 728 S.E.2d 790, 790–91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
129 Id. at 791–92. 
130 See, e.g., De Leon v. AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc., No. B272008, 2018 WL 416539, at *3 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018) (concluding summary judgment for defendant was proper because 
gas company had fixed gas leak a month before plaintiff became dizzy and fell on 
defendant’s steps).  Compare Gordon v. Am. Museum of History, 492 N.E.2d 774, 775 (N.Y. 
1986) (finding that waxed paper on which plaintiff slipped was fresh, suggesting that 
defendant was patrolling steps reasonably), with Anjou v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 94 N.E. 386, 386 
(Mass. 1911) (finding that banana peel upon which plaintiff slipped was blackened and 
gritty, suggesting that defendant was negligently patrolling its platform).   
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6. Expert Evidence was Required to Show Breach of Duty and was 
Absent on Record 
Beyond cost-benefit analysis, another common reason for granting 
summary judgment to a defendant is when the plaintiff’s claim requires 
expert testimony on the standard of care and that testimony is absent or 
inadequate.131 
7. The Defendant’s Act was Involuntary 
Another ground for summary judgment for a party is that his or her 
act was involuntary.  These cases entail situations in which the relevant 
party was not able to use reasonable precaution.132 
B. A Correlative Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a plaintiff’s verdict, the question can be the same as under a 
defense motion for summary judgment—namely, was the defendant 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law?  Sometimes courts will use cost-
benefit analysis in this setting to assure themselves that the burden of 
some untaken precaution was less than its reduction in risk.133  When the 
appellate court finds that no untaken precaution proved at trial had a 
burden less than its benefit, the court will reverse the plaintiff’s 
                                                 
131 See, e.g., Bondy v. Allen, 635 N.W.2d 244, 249, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding 
summary judgment for defendant was proper because plaintiff’s claim for aggravated harm 
against ambulance company required expert testimony, and expert testimony provided was 
inadequate); Upson Cty. Hosp., Inc. v. Head, 540 S.E.2d 626, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (ruling 
that summary judgment for hospital was proper when plaintiff failed to file timely expert 
affidavit on standard of care in medical malpractice case). 
132 See, e.g., Ballew v. Aiello, 422 S.W.2d 396, 397–400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (granting 
summary judgment for defendant who grabbed steering wheel when not fully awake); 
Alexander v. Allen, 538 So. 2d 1372, 1373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling that defendant was 
properly awarded summary judgment when she screamed in response to robber’s demand, 
precipitating shooting of defendant’s licensee in backyard).  Cf. Lobert v. Pack, 9 A.2d 365, 
368 (Pa. 1939) (holding evidence sufficient to support defendant’s verdict and new trial was 
unwarranted when defendant kicked backseat of car while asleep, precipitating accident). 
133 See Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (holding 
that blowing the train’s horn plausibly would have reduced risk more than the burden of 
this precaution, so enough evidence existed to support jury’s liability verdict); Fuentes v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 789 F. Supp. 638, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding it is plausible that stopping 
the train sooner would have reduced risk more than the burden of this precaution so there 
was enough evidence to support jury’s liability verdict); Sw. Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. 
Abeles, 126 S.W. 724, 726 (Ark. 1910) (holding that it is plausible that grounding surge 
protector would have reduced the risk of loud noises more than its burden). 
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judgment.134  Again, just as before, the purpose is to set a ceiling on the 
precautionary requirements created by juries. 
V.  WHEN CAN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BE A CEILING ON PRECAUTION 
REQUIREMENTS? 
Cost-benefit analysis can establish a ceiling for precaution 
requirements only when the untaken precaution alleged as the breach is 
susceptible to the analysis.  Some have argued that this point relates to the 
impossibility of measuring the value of human life, but instead it more 
fundamentally concerns the difficulty of seeing whether an actor was 
adopting an efficient rate of very common precautions that must be used 
repeatedly.  When a surgical team leaves a sponge in a patient or a 
pharmacist misdispenses a drug, it does not necessarily follow that either 
has behaved inconsistently with cost-benefit analysis.  NASA rockets 
crash because of human errors even when millions of dollars have been 
spent to avoid those errors.  The same can be true, on a smaller scale, in 
the operating room and the pharmacy.  Let us look first at the difficulties 
of evaluating human life and limb and then take up the more serious and 
informative question of which types of precautions are subject to reliable 
cost-benefit analysis and which are not. 
A. The Inevitability of Valuations of Human Life and Limb 
Cost-benefit analysis can be used to prevent or annul jury verdicts 
only when cost-benefit analysis can be sensibly used to assess the 
reasonableness of an untaken precaution.  Some Kantians believe that 
cost-benefit analysis is inapposite when human life or serious human 
injury is at stake.135  Even this concession may be inconsistent with Kant’s 
ideas because practically all cost-benefit analysis is a justification for 
treating the victim of affirmative conduct as a “means” toward the actor’s 
ends.  Nevertheless, in the age of technology, when we often act in ways 
that could imperil human life or human flourishing, we inevitably place a 
value on life.  A stroll through Königsberg may not place a value on 
human life or limb, but a drive down the freeway does.  If a person 
routinely drives seventy-five miles per hour on freeways and an actuary 
knew from government data the fatality rate from this practice versus the 
fatality rate from driving at a reasonable or lawful speed and could also 
                                                 
134 Indeed, we have already mentioned these cases.  See, e.g., Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 
93, 93–94 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that plaintiff’s verdict must be reversed because 
plaintiff failed to prove cost-beneficial precaution). 
135 Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. CAL. REV. 
195, 207 (2018) (noting that Kant described humans as “above all price”). 
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estimate how much value the person places on traveling at the higher 
speed, then the actuary could estimate the value that person places on 
human life.  It is a simple algebraic calculation.  Anyone who engages in 
any risky activity is implicitly placing a value on human life.  When courts 
use cost-benefit analysis, they are not introducing any new idea but 
simply evaluating whether private valuations of human life are 
reasonable. 
Let us turn now to the real problem with cost-benefit analysis in the 
context of negligence law.  This problem requires a relatively simple 
taxonomy of potentially untaken precautions. 
B. A Simple Taxonomy of Precautions 
1. Durable and Nondurable Precautions 
A “durable precaution” is basically capital.  It is an asset that is 
purchased once (or infrequently) and yields a stream of safety benefits 
over time.  A “durable precaution” is also a precaution that a defendant 
need not use repetitively because a single investment in it lasts for a long 
time.  Examples are fire escapes, fences, life jackets, and so forth.  By 
contrast, a “nondurable precaution” is basically labor.  Such a precaution 
must normally be used repetitively.  Nondurable precautions are usually 
complements to durable precautions.  A fire escape will need to be 
periodically inspected and serviced to make sure that the last spring-
loaded part of it still extends to the ground when a person steps on it; a 
fence must be periodically checked for holes; life jackets must be checked 
to see whether they are still on the boat.  Nevertheless, nondurable 
precautions can occasionally be substitutes for durable precautions or 
productively independent of them.  For instance, manually checking one’s 
blind spot before changing lanes is a substitute for having a device that 
automatically checks the driver’s blind spot; checking whether a boat’s 
deck has any slippery places on it is a precaution that can be productive 
independently of whether the life jackets are still on the boat; having 
bright-colored strings on surgical sponges can reduce the marginal 
productivity of keeping an accurate count of them and thus is a precaution 
that substitutes for an accurate count.  Just as capital and labor are used 
together to produce physical products, durable precaution and 
nondurable precaution are used together to produce safety. 
2. Precaution Plans 
It is also useful to distinguish between precautions and precaution 
plans.  Courts typically bring a different analysis to faulty precaution 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss3/2
2019] The American Negligence Rule 583 
plans as compared to individual lapses in implementing a good plan.  For 
instance, suppose a good plan is to count the sponges when placed into 
the patient, and then again before the patient is closed, to see whether the 
results tally.  If a surgeon lacked this plan and never counted the sponges, 
it would lead to a conclusion of breach of duty under an objective 
analysis—the Learned Hand formula or some approximation of it.136  If, 
on the other hand, a surgeon possessed this plan but simply failed on one 
occasion to notice that the number of sponges placed into the patient 
exceeded the number retrieved, it would lead to a more subjective analysis 
of breach of duty. 
Theoretically, one could have a plan for both durable and nondurable 
precautions.  One plan might be to replace your tires whenever they 
appear worn, and another plan might be to check your blind spot every 
time before you change lanes.  As a practical matter, plans to use 
nondurable precautions are more salient in negligence cases. 
3. Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Nondurable Precautions 
We can also distinguish between “homogeneous” and 
“heterogeneous” nondurable precautions.  If we posit some plan to use 
nondurable precaution repeatedly, such as to count the surgical sponges 
or to maintain a reasonable speed when driving, we can distinguish two 
different types of iterations:  homogeneous and heterogeneous.  
Homogeneous iterations/precautions are uniform, and heterogeneous 
iterations/precautions are different in the sense that their required quality 
differs according to the variable amount of foreseeable risk avoided by 
each iteration and its cost.  Lapses in either kind of nondurable precaution 
will be called “compliance errors.” 
C. How Does the Taxonomy Aid Our Understanding of Negligence Practice? 
As we will soon see, U.S. courts allow juries to forgive all varieties of 
untaken precautions—durable, nondurable, homogeneous, and 
heterogeneous.  Jury forgiveness is not allowed only in the rare instances 
in which courts find negligence as a matter of law.  As previously 
mentioned, these judgments as a matter of law for plaintiffs—in jury-
                                                 
136 Judgments of breach of duty as a matter of law are very rare, but for a surgeon to adopt 
the plan never to count sponges, or ask anyone in the operating room to count sponges for 
him, would be an extremely dangerous plan that might well lead to liability as a matter of 
law.  See Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket, 836 N.Y.S.2d 486, 486–87 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 16, 
2006) (holding that negligence as a matter of law applies to a store putting shopping carts on 
top of a food freezer to which customers had frequent access). 
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eligible cases—are largely idiosyncratic across jurisdictions.137  The main 
area of inconsistent practice is the violation of selected statutes in some 
jurisdictions.  Nevertheless, a more general bar on jury forgiveness also 
exists, though the cases are so rare that it is difficult at this point to 
establish its importance.  These are willful and wanton failures to use cost-
beneficial durable precautions and precaution plans.  In addition, some 
jurisdictions have begun to bar some impositions of liability for 
nondurable precautions under the rubric of “no duty.”  We will soon 
explore both legal themes. 
The more significant implication of the taxonomy is that courts hardly 
ever limit impositions of liability for lapses in homogeneous nondurable 
precaution.  Effectively, this means that courts allow juries to impose 
liability for some efficient lapses in nondurable precaution.  This latter 
point is the key to much of the complexity of negligence doctrine.  If only 
inefficient lapses were punished by the negligence system, there would be 
much less need for many of the judge-created limitations on negligence 
liability, including in the areas of duty, cause in fact, and proximate cause. 
As a prelude to the subsequent analysis, we briefly explore how 
broadly allowable jury forgiveness extends over the various categories of 
untaken precautions.  Juries can forgive almost all breaches of duty.  
Nevertheless, juries cannot require inefficient precaution except, mainly, 
in the area of nondurable precaution. 
D. “The Quality of Mercy Is Not Strain’d” 
1. Faulty or Omitted Durable Precautions 
A jury was allowed to forgive the absence of highly productive anti-
slip floor runners in a grocery store produce section even when the store’s 
own safety standards required them and when store employees were 
conducting only the most sporadic inspections.138  A jury was permitted 
to forgive a restaurant for maintaining a dangerously slippery and 
unlighted entrance.139  Nevertheless, in highly similar cases, juries were 
also allowed to find defendants liable for the absence of durable 
precautions.140 
                                                 
137 See supra Part III.B. 
138 See Malaney v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 861 A.2d 1069, 1077–78 (Vt. 2004) (holding that the 
“question for the jury was simply whether defendant had taken reasonable steps to protect 
its customers, including plaintiff, from that foreseable hazard”). 
139 Stanford v. Bailey, Inc., 282 P.2d 992, 996–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that jury was 
allowed to forgive dangerous entryway to café where plaintiff slipped and fell). 
140 See, e.g., Poloski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 445, 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that jury was permitted to find defendant retailer jointly liable with a distracted 
seventy-nine-year-old driver when, next to the front of the store, the driver ran over the 
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2. Faulty or Omitted Precaution Plans 
A jury was allowed to forgive landlords who failed to comply with a 
regulatory procedure to abate lead that, because of the noncompliance, led 
to the injury of the plaintiff’s infant son.141  This was a New York case that 
did not entail New York’s doctrine of negligence per se because the statute 
was not a traffic or labor code provision.142  Similarly, juries have been 
allowed to forgive a faulty plan to care for an elder143 and an omitted plan 
to monitor a hypertensive patient’s blood pressure.144  A jury would be 
permitted to forgive a faulty plan of taking an inebriated young person to 
the side of a cliff from which he fell.145 
3. Faulty or Omitted Heterogeneous Nondurable Precautions 
A jury was allowed to forgive a large retailer’s faulty repair of a 
dangerous riding lawn mower that, after the supposed repair, burned the 
plaintiff’s foot so badly that it ultimately became infected with gangrene, 
                                                 
plaintiffs’ decedent; plaintiffs relied on the store’s failure to design the parking lot so as to 
reduce traffic in front of the store, absence of speed bumps, absence of crossing guards, 
absence of marked crosswalks, and so forth); Nin v. Bernard, 683 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (App. 
Div. 1999) (holding that jury was permitted to find that small depression in walkway was 
negligent); Barber v. Presbyterian Hosp., 555 S.E.2d 303, 308 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (jury 
permitted to find defendant liable for plaintiff’s fall down unmarked “step-down” directly 
inside defendant’s coffee shop door); Anderson v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 740 N.E.2d 819, 
828–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (jury permitted to find drainage ditch adjacent to runway was 
negligently placed). 
141 See Vega v. Molina, 658 N.Y.S.2d 387, 400 (App. Div. 1997). 
142 Compare Gonzalez v. Bishop, 68 N.Y.S.3d 454, 455–56 (App. Div. 2018) (holding that 
defendant, who failed to yield statutory right-of-way to through traffic, liable as a matter of 
law despite plaintiff's assertion the defendant was speeding, which court said was 
"speculative"), with Burns v. Marcellus Lanes, Inc., 92 N.Y.S.3d 824, 2019 WL 409216, at *1–2 
(App. Div. Feb. 1, 2019) (holding that plaintiff worker who fell from backhoe bucket while 
cleaning snow and ice off roof was prima facie entitled to judgment as a matter of law under 
New York scaffold law). 
143 See Lane v. Emeritus Corp., 855 N.W.2d 201, 2014 WL 3749425, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. 
July 30, 2014) (unpublished table decision) (holding that jury was allowed to forgive 
defendant nursing home's clearly faulty plan to care for plaintiff's decedent). 
144 See Terajima v. Torrance Memorial Med. Ctr., No. B195298, 2008 WL 192650, at *5 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008) (jury allowed to forgive defendants for their faulty plan of failing to 
monitor plaintiff's blood pressure).  But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) 
(holding defendant ophthalmologist negligent as a matter of law for failing to administer 
glaucoma test to plaintiff when such test was supposedly uncustomary for patients under 
forty years old). 
145 See Carlsen v. Koivumaki, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339, 354 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that jury 
would be allowed to forgive defendants for faulty precaution plan of taking inebriated 
plaintiff to edge of cliff from which he fell).  But see Keenan v. Smith, 197 Cal. Rptr. 32, 32 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (holding defendant landowner negligent as a matter of law for adopting plan not 
to cut down rotten tree). 
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which led to the amputation of both her foot and part of her leg.146  A jury 
was allowed to forgive a home renter who probably failed to use 
reasonable precaution in escaping from a locked sunroom.147 
4. Omitted Homogeneous Nondurable Precautions 
Juries have been allowed to forgive motorists who have rear-ended 
cars stopped ahead of them even when the motorists have offered no 
excuse or justification for their lapses.148  Juries have been allowed to 
forgive motorists who have struck pedestrians who were walking in the 
proper zone.149  Juries may forgive surgeons who have failed to retrieve 
                                                 
146 See Anderson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 664 S.E.2d 911, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).  But see 
Previs v. Dailey, 180 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Ky. 2005) (jury tried to absolve truck driver who failed 
to ensure that he had fully passed bicyclist before swinging back into her space, but court 
reversed and found driver negligent as a matter of law). 
147 See Tyburski v. Stewart, 694 S.E.2d 422, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).  Under the strict rule 
of contributory negligence that barred a plaintiff’s recovery, courts often allowed juries to 
forgive plaintiffs for their negligence.  See, e.g., Granath v. Andrus, 160 P.2d 129 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1945).  The plaintiff in Granath made a mistake in judging the speed and distance of the 
defendant's trailer truck and collided with it; the defendant conceded that it was negligent 
operation of the truck, but the jury found for the plaintiff, and this judgment was affirmed 
because "every mistake of judgment is not negligence, for mistakes are made even in the 
exercise of ordinary care," and "[t]he circumstances under which a court can declare that 
certain acts constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law are rare."  Id. at 130–31.  See 
also Couchman v. Snelling, 295 P. 845, 846–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).  In Couchman, as plaintiff 
was trying to the cross street, he misjudged the closing rate of defendant's auto with the 
right-of-way, and a collision ensued.  Id.  The jury forgave plaintiff’s alleged contributory 
negligence, which was affirmed on appeal because "[t]he circumstances under which a court 
can declare that certain acts constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law are rare."  
Id. at 847. 
148 See, e.g., Melgen v. Suarez, 951 So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Garcia v. 
Leftwich-Kitchen, 412 S.W.3d 348, 351–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Williams v. Thompson, 489 
S.W.3d 823, 826, 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (holding the jury was allowed to forgive defendant 
for rear-end collision when she testified it was raining); Giles v. Riverside Transp., Inc., 266 
S.W.3d 290, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Capshaw v. Gulf Ins. Co., 107 P.3d 595, 604 (Okla. 2005) 
(holding that jury was allowed to forgive driver, who without apparent excuse or 
justification rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle, and reversed trial court's order for new trial); Hurt 
v. Chavis, 739 A.2d 924, 932 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (stating that the jury has power to find 
no liability in a rear-end collision even when defendant has offered no excuse or 
justification); Stone v. Sulak, 994 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. App. 1999) (concluding that the jury 
was allowed to forgive motorist who, without excuse or justification, rear-ended another 
vehicle; opinion collects other similar Texas cases).  But see Guckian v. Fowler, 453 S.W.2d 
323, 326 (Tex. App. 1970) (jury attempted to forgive motorist who rear-ended another car, 
but trial court entered judgment n.o.v. for plaintiff on issue of liability, and appellate court 
affirmed). 
149 See, e.g., Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62, 1835 WL 1732, at *4–5 (Vt. 1835) (holding that 
jury was allowed to forgive defendant who was driving his horse and sulky fast and ran 
down plaintiff, a pedestrian, who was walking in the pedestrian area); Kukuchka v. Ziemet, 
710 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Mont. 1985) (holding that jury was allowed to forgive motorist who 
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surgical instruments from their patients before closing them.150  Similarly, 
juries are often permitted to forgive pharmacists for dispensing the wrong 
drug or the wrong dosage from what was prescribed.151 
A jury was allowed to forgive a wholesale bakery that baked and sold 
a brownie containing a dangerous knife blade that hurt the plaintiff’s 
throat.152  Another jury was allowed to forgive a teacher who, without 
excuse or justification, lost her grip on a piñata bat and struck the plaintiff, 
her first-grade student.153 
                                                 
struck pedestrian from the rear on a dark night).  See also Spriesterbach v. Holland, 155 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 306, 313, 320 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that jury was allowed to forgive motorist who 
struck bicyclist possessing right-of-way because "every mistake of judgment is not 
negligence, for mistakes are made even in the exercise of ordinary care, and whether such 
mistakes of judgment constitute negligence, is a question of fact"). 
150 See, e.g., Houserman v. Garrett, 902 So. 2d 670, 675 (Ala. 2004) (holding that a foreign 
object left in a patient creates only prima facie showing of a surgeon’s negligence that will 
allow jury to forgive the surgeon in a proper case), rev’g Ravi v. Williams, 536 So. 2d 1374, 
1377 (Ala. 1988).  Houserman held it proper to instruct the jury that to impute negligence it 
only had to find that defendant surgeon left the sponge inside the plaintiff and that she 
suffered damage from it.  See also Deuel v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. M2009-01551-COA-R3-
CV, 2010 WL 3237297, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2010).  In Deuel, a defendant surgeon 
left a lap sponge in a patient during pancreatic surgery.  Id. at *1–3.  The parties cross-moved 
for summary judgment, the court denied both motions, and the court of appeals affirmed, 
making it clear that the jury possessed the power to either acquit the surgeon or not.  Id. at 
*2; Estate of Deuel v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. M2011-02610-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 
11021322, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2013) (in remanded case, jury did indeed forgive 
surgeon, and appellate court held that jury was properly instructed and again stressed that 
the jury possessed the power to acquit the surgeon).  See also Warner v. Stewart, No. F037392, 
2002 WL 1970072, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002) (holding jury was allowed to forgive 
surgeon who left retractor in plaintiff).  In Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, the defendant surgeon left a 
lap sponge in the plaintiff during a hysterectomy.  Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 865 N.E.2d 632, 633–
34, 638–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  The jury found for defendant, and the intermediate appellate 
court entered judgment as a matter of law for the patient on the ground that the surgeon said 
only that he relied entirely on the nurse’s count of pads.  Id. at 638–39, rev’d, Chi Yun Ho v. 
Frye, 880 N.E.2d 1192, 1198–99 (Ind. 2008) (remanding the cause for a new trial on ground 
that jury possessed power to acquit surgeon of any negligence). 
151 See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So. 2d 319, 322 (Ala. 2000) (allowing 
jury to forgive pharmacy for misfill); Watkins v. Potts, 122 So. 416, 418 (Ala. 1929) (finding 
the jury was allowed to forgive pharmacist's misfill); Ohio Cty. Drug Co. v. Howard, 256 
S.W. 705, 706 (Ky. 1923) (stating that pharmacist is not “insurer” of accuracy of his 
dispensing, and question of his negligence is for jury), rev’g Fleet & Semple v. Hollenkemp, 
13 B. Mon. 219, 1852 WL 1716, at *7–8 (Ky. 1852).  See also Harris v. Groth, 645 P.2d 1104, 1107 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that jury was allowed to forgive pharmacist dispensing error 
supported by evidence that it caused harm even after trial court had instructed the same jury 
that dispensing error was negligence as a matter of law). 
152 See McDermott v. Coffee Beanery, Ltd., 777 N.Y.S.2d 103, 112–13 (App. Div. 2004). 
153 See A.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Bellingham Sch. Dist., 105 P.3d 400, 410–11 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005). 
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VI.  WHAT NEGLIGENT CONDUCT CAN JURIES NOT FORGIVE? 
There is little uniformity across the U.S. on what types of negligence 
juries cannot forgive.  As already noted, judgments of negligence liability 
as a matter of law are much rarer than judgments of no liability as a matter 
of law.154  Still, it is possible to generalize on this subject. 
A. When a Party Engaged in Deliberate Gross Negligence 
Suppose the evidence indicates that a defendant has deliberately 
acted, or not acted, so as to create a large amount of risk to others.  In the 
language of the law, such a defendant has “willfully and wantonly” 
engaged in “gross negligence.”155  This is the type of conduct that often 
yields punitive as well as actual damages.  Consistently, the courts often 
find such defendants “negligent as a matter of law” and thus prevent any 
possibility of jury forgiveness.  These cases are uncommon in the case 
reports, probably because they often settle for full damages. 
Here are two examples.  In Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket,156 the 
defendant had stored heavy, wheeled shopping carts on top of a freezer 
from which its customers retrieved food products.  When the predictable 
occurred and a cart toppled onto the plaintiff, she sued.  The court found 
the defendant negligent as matter of law.157  The defendant had 
deliberately engaged in gross negligence.  Similarly, in Newing v. 
Cheatham,158 a civil aviation pilot failed to check his fuel gauge for several 
                                                 
154 See, e.g., Morejon v. Rais Constr. Co., 851 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (N.Y. 2006) (explaining that 
liability as a matter of law cases are rare under res ipsa theory). 
155 See Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of “Gross Negligence or Willful 
Misconduct,” 71 LA. L. REV. 957, 967 (2011) (defining gross negligence). 
156 See Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket, 836 N.Y.S.2d 486, 2006 WL 3772314, at *2 (Sup. 
Ct. Aug. 16, 2006) (unpublished table decision).  See also American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 186 
F.2d 529, 533–34 (D.C. Cir. 1949).  In American Airlines v. Ulen, the court found the defendant 
negligent as a matter of law for adopting a flight plan in which its airliner would cross a 
3910-foot mountain at 4000 feet when FAA regulations required at least 1000 feet of 
clearance, and the aircraft struck a mountain, injuring the plaintiff.  Id. at 530–31.  The court 
found liability as a matter of law existed notwithstanding the Warsaw Convention because 
defendant was guilty of "wilful misconduct."  Id. at 533–34.  See also Deep River Assocs., 
L.L.C. v. McCann, No. MMXCV156013881, 2016 WL 1397582, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 
2016) (finding defendants, owners and operators of long-time dry-cleaning business, were 
guilty of negligence per se and personally liable to property purchasers for violating 
environmental statutes by dumping a dangerous chemical that plaintiffs had to remediate); 
Jacobs v. Westgate, 766 So. 2d 1175, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam) (holding the 
defendant negligent as a matter of law for removing plaintiff's possessions onto curb were 
they were stolen and ruined by rain). 
157 See Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket, 836 N.Y.S.2d 486, 2006 WL 3772314, at *2 (Sup. 
Ct. 2004). 
158 See Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1975). 
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hours.  When the plane ran out of fuel it crashed, killing all aboard.  A 
passenger’s survivor sued the pilot’s estate.  There was also evidence that 
the pilot had stopped at a bar and drank beer the morning of the flight, 
and empty beer cans were strewn around the crash site.  The investigators 
testified that the pilot’s body smelled of alcohol but that the plaintiff’s 
decedent’s body did not.159  The trial court entered judgment as a matter 
of law for the plaintiff, which was affirmed.160  Again, the defendant had 
deliberately engaged in gross negligence. 
Corresponding cases show that a plaintiff’s deliberate act of gross 
negligence will often bar his or her recovery as a matter of law.161 
B. When Jury Bias Was Probable 
Courts will often find negligence as a matter of law when, despite the 
plaintiff presenting a strong case, the jury acquits the defendant, and it 
seems probable that the jury was biased either against the plaintiff or in 
favor of the defendant.  A good example is Huetter v. Andrews.162  That case 
involved an auto accident that occurred right after World War II when the 
defendant, who was twenty-two years old, had just been discharged from 
the Marine Corps.  Failing to notice over a long period of time that the 
plaintiff’s car was crossing the highway ahead of him,163 the recently 
discharged Marine did not slow or brake his vehicle but ran directly into 
the plaintiff’s car.  At the trial, both the defendant and his lawyer 
conspicuously wore their Marine Corps discharge buttons, and the trial 
court also allowed the defendant’s war record to be admitted into 
evidence.164  The plaintiff was an elderly woman.  The jury returned a 
verdict for the defendant, and the trial court entered judgment on it.165  
                                                 
159 Id. at 38. 
160 Id. at 44. 
161 See, e.g., Proffitt v. Gosnell, 809 S.E.2d 200, 213 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (finding 
contributory negligence as a matter of law after plaintiff stood on top of a tree that had fallen 
across the road until a car struck him); Quiktrip Corp. v. Fesenko, 491 S.E.2d 504, 505–06 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1997) (finding contributory negligence as a matter of law when plaintiff stood for 
three to five minutes in a stream of gasoline from an allegedly malfunctioning retail pump); 
Horn v. Oh, 195 Cal. Rptr. 720, 724 (Ct. App. 1983) (after plaintiff's apparent settlement with 
other defendants involved in dangerous and reckless pickup-truck-pushing venture that 
hurt plaintiff bystander, jury attempted to absolve defendant who went to trial and who was 
gratuitous volunteer in venture, but court held jury could not forgive him and that this 
volunteer was negligent as a matter of law). 
162 See Huetter v. Andrews, 204 P.2d 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949). 
163 Id. at 656–57.  The plaintiff’s son, who was driving, began to cross the highway when it 
was safe to do so but traveled very slowly.  Id.  The road was straight, the weather good, and 
the defendant’s forward view was unobstructed over the long period of time in which he 
was approaching the plaintiff’s car.  Id. 
164 Id. at 657. 
165 Id. 
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The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant had been 
negligent as a matter of law and stressed that the jury may have been 
improperly sympathetic to the defendant.166 
C. Idiosyncratic Statutory Violations 
The main arena for negligence as a matter of law is compliance errors 
that also amount to traffic or labor code violations.  New York possesses 
an especially rich jurisprudence of these cases dating from the famous 
Cardozo opinion in Martin v. Herzog.167  In Smith v. Omanes,168 the plaintiff 
assumed that the defendant would stop at a stop sign, but he instead ran 
the stop sign and collided with her.  The court upheld partial summary 
judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, stressing that the 
defendant had violated the state’s vehicle code and that the plaintiff 
possessed the statutory right-of-way.169  This is the standard result 
reached by New York courts in these cases so long as the plaintiff can 
show that she was free of comparative negligence, as in Smith v. Omanes, 
when plaintiff was entitled to assume that the defendant would obey the 
statute and had only seconds to react to his violation of it.  Nevertheless, 
the picture is far from simple.  Even in New York, many statutory 
violations, even traffic and labor code violations, yield upheld defense 
verdicts.170 
                                                 
166 Id. at 658.  Ayala v. Lee was a similar case.  Ayala v. Lee, 81 A.3d 584, 587–88 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2013).  During a severe rainstorm, the plaintiffs were parked on a highway 
shoulder, fixing a windshield wiper, when their car was struck by the defendant, who 
violated traffic laws by being off lane and not keeping a good lookout.  Id.  The plaintiffs 
were undocumented immigrants who were suing, inter alia, for lost wages.  Id. at 588.  The 
jury tried to acquit the defendant, but the appellate court found the defendant negligent as a 
matter of law and remanded for a trial on damages with detailed instructions on how 
plaintiffs’ undocumented status should be handled.  Id. at 599. 
167 See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 820 (N.Y. 1920) (concluding that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for violating a statute requiring his buggy to show 
a light after dark). 
168 See Smith v. Omanes, 998 N.Y.S.2d 198, 198 (App. Div. 2014). 
169 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1142(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2018). 
170 Even in New York, when two defendants have each committed traffic violations, the 
jury can forgive one of them on proximate cause grounds.  See Gibson v. Singh Towing, Inc., 
155 A.D.3d 614, 616 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Pierre v. Andre, 151 A.D.3d 1089, 1090 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2017); Kohler v. Barker, 147 A.D.3d 1037, 1037–38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).  In New York, 
defendant who rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle and pleaded guilty to a traffic violation of 
traveling too closely could still be forgiven on evidence that the truck in front of plaintiff’s 
vehicle stopped suddenly.  Jones v. Egan, 585 A.D.2d 909, 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).  The 
strict New York rule may be changing.  In Zhubrak v. Petro, a New York jury was allowed to 
forgive the defendant’s apparent traffic violation in failing to yield the right-of-way.  
Zhubrak v. Petro, 48 N.Y.S.3d 704, 705–06 (App. Div. 2017), aff'g 998 N.Y.S.2d 85 (App. Div. 
2014) (holding that a new trial was proper, as opposed to judgment as a matter of law for 
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California and other states allow juries to forgive even statutory 
violations.  In Minnegren v. Nozar,171 the plaintiff again had the statutory 
right-of-way when the defendant ran a stop sign and collided with her.  
Two independent witnesses testified that the defendant ran the stop sign 
and even accelerated through the intersection.172  The defendant himself 
admitted on the stand that he caused the collision, but not “intentionally,” 
and that he was “only human” and “made a mistake.”173  The 
investigating officer found that the collision was caused by his failing to 
yield at the stop sign, that the defendant was the “the party at fault,” and 
that a contributing cause was the defendant’s speed in running the stop 
sign.174  The Los Angeles jury found for the defendant.175  The plaintiff 
appealed on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, that the evidence 
showed that the accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence as a 
matter of law.176  The California Court of Appeals instead affirmed the 
defense verdict and stressed that “not every mistake equates to 
negligence” and that it was the jury’s role to determine whether this 
mistake should yield liability or not.177  In California and many states, 
juries can forgive compliance errors, even compliance errors that violate 
traffic statutes designed to protect the type of plaintiff who sued.178 
A notable exception to California’s policy of requiring all compliance 
error cases to be tried to juries is violations of its crosswalk statutes.  In 
Gray v. Brinkerhoff,179 the defendant was turning his pickup truck left 
across a crosswalk and struck the plaintiff carrying groceries in the middle 
of a crosswalk.  The jury found the plaintiff contributorily negligent 
                                                 
plaintiff, when jury forgave defendant for striking plaintiff's car in intersection from stop-
sign-controlled side street). 
171 See Minnegren v. Nozar, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 658 (Ct. App. 2016). 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 660. 
174 Id. at 659. 
175 Id. at 660. 
176 Id.  
177 Id. at 664. 
178 See, e.g., Spriesterbach v. Holland, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 321 (Ct. App. 2013) (defendant, 
without statutory right-of-way, ran directly into bicyclist with right-of-way; after the 
accident, plaintiff rudely complained to defendant; defense jury verdict was affirmed even 
with concededly erroneous instructions unfavorable to plaintiff, determined by appellate 
court to be “harmless error”); Safirstein v. Nunes, 50 Cal. Rptr. 642, 642 (Ct. App. 1966) (car 
without statutory right-of-way ran directly into car in which plaintiff was passenger; defense 
verdict affirmed).  California courts often stress that “mistakes are made even in the exercise 
of ordinary care” and even with respect to statutory duties.  See De Priest v. City of Glendale, 
169 P.2d. 17, 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946).  This doctrine seems to have arisen as a means of 
forgiving the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.  Id. (“[M]istakes are made even in the 
exercise of ordinary care.”).  This doctrine is now applied to primary negligence. 
179 See Gray v. Brinkerhoff, 258 P.2d 834, 835 (Cal. 1953). 
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though there was little evidence to support that finding.  The California 
Supreme Court found not only that the evidence was insufficient to show 
contributory negligence (in other words, that the plaintiff was not liable 
as a matter of law) but also that the defendant was negligent as a matter 
of law.180  It seems from the opinion that the court’s main concern was to 
limit jury findings of contributory negligence, but a corollary of that wish 
was to find the defendant negligent as a matter of law in this case.  The 
defendant had offered two excuses for hitting the plaintiff:  (1) that his 
attention was diverted by a fast-approaching car; and (2) that his vision of 
the plaintiff was obscured by the front part of his truck.181  The court found 
both excuses legally insufficient and stressed that the plaintiff possessed 
the statutory right-of-way.182 
Gray v. Brinkerhoff was immediately limited by Callahan v. Gray,183 a 
case in which the plaintiff walked into the defendant’s car, which was 
stopped in a crosswalk.  In addition, there was no evidence of damages.  
The court affirmed the jury verdict for the defendant.184  Subsequent 
California crosswalk collision cases entail a mixture of liability as a matter 
of law185 and deference to the jury verdict.186  Nevertheless, holdings of 
                                                 
180 Id. at 836. 
181 Id.  
182 Id. (“‘The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing the 
roadway within any marked crosswalk . . . .’  It is undisputed that defendant did not yield 
the right of way to plaintiff.  Such failure constitutes a violation of the statute and negligence 
as a matter of law in the absence of reasonable explanation for defendant’s conduct.”).   
183 See Callahan v. Gray, 279 P.2d 963, 965 (Cal. 1955). 
184 See id. (holding that evidence supported jury finding that plaintiff negligently walked 
into the side of defendant’s car). 
185 See Novak v. Dewar, 361 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1961) (finding the defendant negligent as a 
matter of law and plaintiff nonnegligent as a matter of law).  See also La Manna v. Stewart, 
530 P.2d 1073, 1083 (Cal. 1975) (concluding that defendant motorist was negligent as a matter 
of law); Schmitt v. Henderson, 462 P.2d 30, 34 (Cal. 1969) (deciding that defendant motorist 
was negligent as a matter of law and plaintiff pedestrian nonnegligent as a matter of law).   
186 See Shoemake v. Wilsey, 277 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1954) (upholding a verdict for defendant 
motorist).  See also Flores v. McCoy, 186 Cal. App. 2d 502 (1960) (holding that the jury was 
entitled to find pedestrian contributorily negligent); Myers v. Carini, 262 Cal. App. 2d 614 
(1968) (upholding the jury verdict despite questioning the instruction given to the jury); 
Byrne v. County of San Francisco, 113 Cal. App. 3d 731 (1980) (holding that there was no 
abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on sufficiency of evidence); 
Cohen v. Bay Area Pie Co., 217 Cal. App. 2d 69 (1963) (holding jury was entitled to find that 
the pedestrian had waived right-of-way in crosswalk); Mandakunian v. Zoller, No. B161836, 
2004 WL 2712207 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (upholding defense verdict for bus driver 
who never saw pedestrian); Vitushkina v. Luminalt Energy Corp., No. A140393, 2014 WL 
5803935 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2014) (upholding defense verdict and distinguishing a case 
on which plaintiff relied); Webb v. Van Noort, 48 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1966) (finding that, 
under the statute, the jury was entitled to excuse motorist lacking knowledge that his turn 
signal bulb was defective). 
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liability as a matter of law for motorist crosswalk violations extend into 
present times.187 
VII.  WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? 
Cost-benefit analysis limits excessive requirements for durable 
precaution, precaution plans, and heterogeneous nondurable precautions.  
With respect to homogeneous nondurable precautions, like checking 
blind spots and retrieving surgical sponges, the only control on jury 
behavior is when the allegedly omitted nondurable precaution would 
have been part of a precaution plan that was not cost-justified.  
Nevertheless, it is surely uneconomic for the law to insist that people be 
perfect in their use of homogeneous nondurable precaution.  This seems 
to be the primary justification for jury forgiveness of negligence, and jury 
forgiveness is indeed most prominent in this area, though it is available 
for other types of precaution as well.  Whether the law creates too much 
liability for lapses in nondurable precaution is a question that depends 
partly on how frequently juries forgive. 
It might be objected that a more appropriate remedy would be to 
allow the parties to explore the defendant’s historical error rate.  Courts 
have largely rejected this option, as the following analysis demonstrates. 
A. Inadmissibility of Prior Similar Incidents of Negligence 
A seemingly logical way for courts to solve the problem of whether a 
single error was negligent would be to allow plaintiffs to introduce 
evidence about the defendant’s safety habits and reputation for safety, 
especially prior identical errors.  For instance, if a surgeon had a record of 
leaving foreign objects in patients, then let the jury hear that evidence as 
relevant to whether he or she was maintaining a reasonable and efficient 
compliance rate.  Surprisingly, the courts rarely allow this evidence to be 
introduced on the issue of liability because they say it could be too 
prejudicial. 
Much of this doctrine can be explained by the hypothesis that courts 
believe juries would be too likely to find liability based on a small and 
possibly unlucky set of prior errors.  Under this rule of evidence, a surgeon 
who has forgotten two sponges or a pharmacist who has misdispensed 
two prescriptions could be driven from his profession even though his 
actual error rate might be above average.  The courts’ logic appears to be 
                                                 
187 See Asmelash v. Braga, No. H023824, 2003 WL 21437634 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2003) 
(finding defendant motorist negligent as a matter of law in crosswalk violation case in which 
no comparative negligence issue existed).   
Grady: The American Negligence Rule
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
594 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
that every surgeon188 or pharmacist189 must be exposed to suit for each 
error but that it is undesirable that juries should be influenced by a record 
of prior errors because such a record can be deceptive in a world in which 
all surgeons and pharmacists err.  In fact, this same rule applies to 
nonprofessional errors, such as driving errors,190 presumably for the same 
reason.  On the other hand, once a jury has found liability, it is proper to 
allow evidence of the defendant’s prior similar errors on the issue of 
punitive damages.191  Nevertheless, normally evidence supporting 
punitive damages would be inadmissible unless there was also some 
evidence that the defendant had acted with a conscious and deliberate 
disregard of the interests of others.192 
The concern seems to be restricted to limiting damage to reputation 
based on an unscientific sample.  Where reputation is not involved, but 
instead the plaintiff wants to introduce evidence that prior pedestrians 
                                                 
188 See Jackson v. Hajj, No. E030178, 2003 WL 21329772 (Cal. Ct. App. June 10, 2003) 
(holding evidence of prior bungled surgery inadmissible against surgeon on issue of 
negligence).  Modern medical malpractice reform statutes sometimes prohibit a plaintiff 
seeking to discover prior similar error by a health care professional, including a pharmacist, 
which adds more force to the common-law rule in this arena.  See Ex parte Rite Aid of Ala., 
Inc., 768 So. 2d 960, 963 (Ala. 2000) (holding that pharmacy was entitled to writ of mandamus 
against discovery order seeking evidence of pharmacist’s prior dispensing errors similar to 
dispensing error that killed plaintiff’s decedent). 
189 See State ex rel. Malan v. Huesemann, 942 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that evidence of pharmacist’s prior errors was inadmissible against him to show that he 
probably made the error in question or for just about any other reason).   
190 See Grenadier v. Surface Transp. Corp. N.Y., 271 A.D. 460, 461 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946) 
(holding driver’s previous accidents inadmissible).  See also Hartley v. Szadkowski, 32 
A.D.2d 550, 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (holding evidence about plaintiff’s prior auto accident 
inadmissible in subsequent auto accident case); Robinson v. Albany, 218 N.Y.S.2d 421 (App. 
Div. 1961) (holding that defendant police officer could not be asked about prior patrol car 
accidents in case involving another accident in which plaintiff’s decedent was killed); 
Downing v. Barrett Mobile Home Transp., 113 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding it was 
reversible error to examine a party to an auto accident about prior accidents).   
191 See Marjorie A. Shields, Exemplary or Punitive Damages for Pharmacist's Wrongful Conduct 
in Preparing or Dispensing Medical Prescription—Cases Not under Consumer Product Safety Act 
(15 U.S.C.A. § 2072), 109 A.L.R. 5th 397 (2003) (describing standards for establishing liability 
against a pharmacist for compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful conduct in 
preparing or filling a medical prescription).  See also McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 
225, 237 (Iowa 2000) (holding prior incidents of misfilled prescriptions relevant to punitive 
damages); Harco Drugs v. Holloway, 669 So. 2d 878, 881 (Ala. 1995) (prior incidents of 
misfilled prescriptions relevent to punitive damages). 
192 See Gregory v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P., No. CV 212-042, 2013 WL 3976648 (S.D. Ga. 
Aug. 12, 2013) (holding that defendant, who misfilled prescription, was entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of punitive damages unless there was evidence it possessed “such a 
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called 
wilful or wanton” (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Warren, 650 S.E.2d 307, 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007))).  See also Mableton Parkway CVS, Inc. v. Salter, 615 S.E.2d 558, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that punitive damages were unavailable for a simple dispensing error). 
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had slipped on a particular cement divider, that evidence will be 
received.193  Where a building had a prior fire, and there was independent 
evidence of construction and maintenance problems, evidence of prior fire 
was admissible relative to the issue of whether negligence had led to the 
current fire.194  Consistently, the defendant in Crafter v. Metropolitan 
Railway, discussed above, was allowed to introduce evidence that no 
record existed of any other slip and fall on the steps in question since their 
construction.195  When the defendant’s similar barrel of sulfuric acid 
exploded on the same day as the barrel explosion that hurt the plaintiff, 
the prior explosion was admissible to show the defendant’s negligence.196  
Nevertheless, when the proffered evidence goes more to the defendant’s 
reputation for care than to a defined hazardous condition, the evidence is 
excluded.197 
B. A Stochastic Tax 
The common-law system imposes a stochastic tax on negligent 
behavior.  Even obviously negligent behavior often earns jury forgiveness 
and sometimes yields large damages.  The very uncertainty of this system 
encourages the settlement of claims.  Very few plaintiffs can afford to roll 
the wheel between one state of the world in which they receive a million 
dollars and another state of the world in which they recover zero and even 
have to pay the defendant some significant amount of his or her court 
                                                 
193 See Gilbert v. Pessin Grocery Co., 282 P.2d 148, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (concluding that 
prior trip and falls on cement divider in supermarket parking lot were admissible to show 
foreseeability of hazard).  See also Martin v. Our Lady of Wisdom Reg'l Sch., 54 N.Y.S.3d 692 
(App. Div. 2017) (holding that prior accidents with defendant's gate were admissible to prove 
defendant's negligence).   
194 See Sivit v. Vill. Green of Beachwood, No. 98401, 2013 WL 177465 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 
17, 2013) (holding that evidence of specific dangerous conditions at building and previously 
litigated fires were both admissible).  See also Kelly v. GEPA Hotel Owner Indianapolis LLC, 
993 N.E.2d 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that with allegations of negligent inspection and 
maintenance, a juror could reasonably conclude that a more careful inspection of the elevator 
on the two incidents prior to the plaintiff’s fall would have revealed a defeat in the motion 
controller). 
195 See Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1866) 1 LRCP 300, 301–04 (Eng.) (holding evidence 
insufficient to show negligence). 
196 See Gall v. Union Ice Co., 239 P.2d 48, 58–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (finding that when 
plaintiff was hurt by defendant’s exploding barrel of sulfuric acid, evidence that another of 
defendant’s barrels exploded on the same day was admissible to show negligence).   
197 See Johnson v. Target Corp., 487 F. App'x 298 (7th Cir. 2012) (trial court’s exclusion of 
evidence of similar slip and falls at the same store was proper). 
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costs.198  The system also encourages potential injurers to become insured, 
either through market insurance or self-insurance. 
The operation of the system is a far cry from the Euclidean conception 
of the classical legal economists who have now thoroughly modeled the 
conditions under which various liability rules will induce zero negligence.  
The actual negligence system generates thousands, probably hundreds of 
thousands, of negligent acts every day.  Many of these are efficient in the 
sense that they cannot be prevented at reasonable cost.  Still, it is very 
difficult for courts to assess whether they are efficient or not.  The major 
problem is that most efficient negligent acts look the same as their 
inefficient counterparts.  The ultimate issue is the rate of a person’s 
negligent behavior, which cannot cheaply be measured.  How well the 
negligence system performs in producing safety at reasonable cost has 
become an empirical question.  The system is a decentralized system of 
social control that in some settings seems to produce a significant amount 
of safety.  How else, with today’s technology, would we create so much 
safety on public highways and elsewhere? 
VIII.  EXPLAINING DEFENDANTS’ APPELLATE ADVANTAGE 
The empirical literature has uncovered a puzzle.  On appeal, 
defendants’ verdicts seem much more secure than plaintiffs’ verdicts, and 
defendants’ verdicts after a bench trial seem much more secure than 
defendants’ verdicts after a jury trial.199  These findings extend across a 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Minnegren v. Nozar, 4 Cal. App. 5th 500 (2016) (ordering plaintiff to pay 
defendant’s court costs in a case in which defendant failed to yield right-of-way and t-boned 
plaintiff). 
199 See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux—An 
Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 100, 114 (2015) 
[hereinafter Eisenberg & Heise Redux].  Other reports of different levels of defendants’ 
appellate advantage for different types of cases are contained in Kevin M. Clermont & 
Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial:  Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 125, 137 tbl.2 (2001) (reporting different levels of defendants’ appellate advantage in 
different types of federal cases from 1988–97); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts:  Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 954 tbl.2 (2002) (reporting appellate reversal rates in different types 
of federal cases from 1988–97); Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State 
Courts—An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 127–28, 134 
tbl.2 (2009) (reporting different levels of defendants’ appellate advantage in different types 
of state cases, 2001–05); Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, Why Do Plaintiffs Lose 
Appeals?  Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates?, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
73, 76, 99 tbl.7 (2013) (reporting different levels of defendants’ appellate advantage in 
different types of federal cases from 1988–98) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Farber]; Michael 
Heise & Martin T. Wells, Revisiting Eisenberg and Plaintiff Success:  State Court Civil Trial and 
Appellate Outcomes, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 516, 516, 524 tbl.2 (2016) (reporting different 
levels of defendants’ appellate advantage in different types of state cases from 2001–09). 
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variety of cases, including negligence cases.  Among negligence “motor 
vehicle” cases tried in state courts between 2005 and 2009, defendants won 
31.0% of their appeals, and plaintiffs won only 12.5% of their own.200  
During the same period, defendants won 32.1% of medical malpractice 
appeals, while plaintiffs in these cases won 24.2% of their appeals.201 
Empirical scholars have mainly argued that trial courts and their juries 
favor plaintiffs because they empathize with victims; then, to restore 
balance, appellate courts disfavor plaintiffs.202  Because appellate courts 
perceive that juries favor plaintiffs more than trial judges do, appellate 
courts’ favor of defendants is more pronounced when they review jury-
tried, as opposed to bench-tried, cases.203  Another theory is that plaintiffs 
often bring weak cases to trial, and these weak cases are then recognized 
as bad cases by appellate courts possibly, again, because trial courts are 
biased in favor of plaintiffs.204 
If we think first of negligence law, we can better explain negligence 
defendants’ appellate advantage with negligence law’s inherent 
asymmetry in which, at all levels, judgments as a matter of law are much 
more common for defendants than for plaintiffs.205  A basic purpose of 
judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs is to prevent jury forgiveness of 
violations of recognized legal standards, and a corresponding purpose of 
judgments as a matter of law for defendants is to prevent juries from 
implementing their own excessive standards that go beyond the 
recognized legal standard.  When a body of law like negligence allows 
many more judgments as a matter of law for defendants than for plaintiffs, 
it suggests that courts are more concerned about juries implementing an 
excessive legal standard than they are concerned about jury forgiveness.  
                                                 
200 See Eisenberg & Heise Redux, supra note 199, at 114 tbl.2. 
201 See id.  The apparent defendants’ advantage in medical malpractice cases possessed a 
lower statistical significance as compared to motor vehicle cases because of a smaller number 
of cases in the sample. 
202 See Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 199, at 106 (providing several related theories for 
defendants’ appellate advantage). 
203 See Eisenberg & Heise Redux, supra note 199, at 105–06. 
204 See id. at 105–08. 
205 Further evidence for this asymmetry is that in federal court tort cases, defendants filed 
85% of the motions for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed only 14% of these motions.  
See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson 
6 tbl.1 (Aug. 13, 2008), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/sujulrs2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RQU3-SN3N] [hereinafter Cecil & Cort Memorandum].  This statistic 
from federal courts probably understates the asymmetry in state courts because many of the 
tort cases tried in federal courts are FTCA cases, always tried to judges, which facilitates 
judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs.  Indeed, no other judgment is possible.  See also 
Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics:  The Life of the Parties, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1663, 1669 (2014) (finding that the “vast majority” of federal tort summary judgment 
motions are filed by defendants). 
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The desire of appellate courts to protect jury forgiveness could explain 
why negligence defendants’ jury verdicts seem so secure on appeal, 
especially in areas in which jury forgiveness is prominent, such as 
negligence law.206 
Think again of Minnegren v. Nozar,207 which was discussed above.208  
In that case several witnesses testified that to get to an open parking space, 
the defendant ran a stop sign and then heedlessly accelerated through an 
intersection and struck the plaintiff.  We know that the defendant offered 
over $20,000 to settle this case, but the plaintiff rejected it and went to trial 
where the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.  Why the jury forgave 
the defendant we do not know.  Perhaps the jurors inferred that the 
defendant had probably made a settlement offer, and they were angered 
that they had to take time to decide the case.209  Or they could have just 
liked the defendant better than the plaintiff.  In either event, once the jury 
found for the defendant, the verdict was fortified by the appellate court’s 
procedural rules.  This means the facts of the case became the defendant’s 
version of the facts so long as they were supported by “substantial 
evidence,” which in extreme cases like Minnegren can mean merely the 
evidence of a single self-serving witness, even when opposed by multiple 
independent witnesses.  Because the defendant had testified that he did 
stop at the stop sign and that he looked for opposing traffic, those became 
the legally germane facts on appeal.  If the plaintiff had won the jury 
verdict, the legally germane facts on appeal would have been the opposite.  
Thus, these fact-interpretative rules have an equal tendency to lock in both 
defendants’ and plaintiffs’ verdicts and do not, by themselves, solve the 
puzzle. 
As suggested above, the root cause of defendants’ appellate 
advantage may be that defendants possess many more arguments than 
plaintiffs for judgment as a matter of law.  Most importantly, if a court 
thought that a plaintiff’s alleged and proven untaken precaution against 
the defendant was not required by cost-benefit analysis, the court will 
                                                 
206 As noted at the beginning of Part VIII, among negligence “motor vehicle” cases tried in 
state courts between 2005 and 2009, defendants won 31.0% of their appeals, and plaintiffs 
won only 12.5% of their own.  See supra text accompanying note 200.  During the same period, 
defendants won 32.1% of medical malpractice appeals, while plaintiffs in these cases won 
24.2% of their appeals. See supra text accompanying note 201.  See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise 
Redux, supra note 199, at 114 tbl.2 (providing statistics on motor vehicle and medical 
malpractice cases).  Defendants’ lesser appellate advantage in medical malpractice cases may 
suggest that courts are more concerned with jury forgiveness of medical negligence than 
with jury forgiveness of motorist negligence possibly because juries are more disposed to 
forgive medical negligence, perhaps excessively in the appellate courts’ view. 
207 Minnegren v. Nozar, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655 (Ct. App. 2016). 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 171–77. 
209 The jury of course would not have been told about the plaintiff’s settlement offered. 
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reverse a plaintiff’s verdict.  In medical and professional malpractice cases, 
a court will reverse a jury’s verdict because of an absence or paucity of 
expert evidence showing that the untaken precaution proven by the 
plaintiff was required by the ruling professional standards.  Plaintiffs who 
have lost verdicts possess no equivalent appellate arrows to aim at their 
victorious opponents.  It seems that many bodies of substantive law create 
larger opportunity sets for no liability as a matter of law210 than for its 
opposite.  With these bodies of law, like negligence, the imbalance in 
appellate success suggests that courts are more concerned with preventing 
the implementation of excessive jury conceptions of the legal standard 
than they are about jury forgiveness of violations of the legal standard.  
This theory also suggests a prediction that can be empirically assessed.  
Defendants’ appellate advantage should be least pronounced for bodies 
of substantive law in which judgments as a matter of law for plaintiffs are 
about as frequent as those for defendants.211 
The ratios of plaintiff-to-defendant appellate wins famously fail to 
conform to the 50-50 ratio theorized by Priest and Klein.212  Nevertheless, 
Priest and Klein expressly limited their theory and empirical evidence to 
trials.213  Because appeals result only from tried cases,214 and not from the 
much larger set of potential legal claims, these appeals are not intensively 
“selected” from a large pool as tried cases are.  Under the Priest-Klein 
theory, the proportion of won and lost appeals should better reflect the 
overall proportion of wins and losses in the general population of similar 
appeals.  Although defendants generally win more appeals than plaintiffs, 
                                                 
210 See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A Quarter-Century 
of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 
886–89 (2007) (defendants make nearly three times more motions for summary judgment, 
and succeed on them more often, than plaintiffs); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010) (criticizing trends toward 
judgment as matter of law for defendants following the ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009)). 
211 See infra text accompanying notes 212–22 (providing more predictors of defendants’ 
appellate advantage within specific areas of law). 
212 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Priest & Klein] (first theorizing that trial results should be 
distributed approximately 50% for plaintiffs and 50% for defendants); Donald Wittman, Is 
the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985) (criticizing the Priest-Klein 
theory and offering a somewhat different theory); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection 
Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985) (defending the 
Priest-Klein theory). 
213 Priest and Klein repeatedly refer to “trials” and “verdicts,” and all their empirical 
evidence in support of their 50% theory relates to trial results.  See Priest & Klein, supra note 
212, at 30–51. 
214 Under Priest-Klein and other studies following it, a trial can include a sustained motion 
for summary judgment or a sustained demurrer or motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. 
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the degree of the appellate advantage possessed by defendants varies 
significantly across different bodies of law.215 
Plaintiffs’ judgments as a matter of law in copyright infringement cases 
are probably a much higher proportion relative to defendants’ judgments 
as a matter of law when compared to the proportion between the two in 
negligence cases.216  For instance, when a defendant makes a slavish or 
mechanical copy of a plaintiff’s copyrighted work, the plaintiff can win 
partial summary judgment on the issue of liability without the need to 
send this part of the case to a jury.217  Such copyright cases appear to be 
relatively common.218  That the possibilities for judgment as a matter of 
law are equally balanced may be symptomatic of a body of law in which 
jury forgiveness of defendants is not a large factor, either because jury 
forgiveness would not promote the courts’ objectives (so that courts 
prevent it) or because juries are not disposed to forgive violations of the 
body of law in question.  In addition, unlike with negligence cases, juries 
in copyright cases may not be disposed to implement an excessive legal 
standard, which would be another factor that would bring copyright 
judgments as a matter law for defendants more into balance with similar 
judgments for plaintiffs.  Consistently, and in contrast to negligence 
                                                 
215 See Eisenberg & Heise Redux, supra note 199, at 114 tbl.2.  Defendants possess extreme 
appellate advantages in state court actions involving “assault, slander, libel”; “products 
liability”; and “employment contract.”  Id.  In all of these substantive areas, it is plausible 
that courts would be more concerned about the implementation of excessive liability 
standards than with jury forgiveness.  
216 I have been unable to find what, if any, is defendants’ appellate advantage in copyright 
cases.  To my knowledge, the only area in which plaintiffs possess an appellate advantage is 
with federal “negotiable instruments” cases.  See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 954 tbl.2 (2002).  Because I know less about that body of law than 
copyright, I am using copyright as my example.  The empirical literature does record a low 
defendants’ appellate advantage in “intellectual property” cases. 
217 See, e.g., Sanrio, Inc. v. Ronnie Home Textile, Inc., No. CV 14-06369-RSWL-JEMx, 2016 
WL 5956096, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016) (holding that summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiff is proper, inter alia, where the “works are so overwhelmingly identical that the 
possibility of independent creation is precluded”); Alan J. Hartnick, Summary Judgment in 
Copyright:  From Cole Porter to Superman, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53 (1984). 
218 The search “adv:  copyright & ‘summary judgment #in favor #of plaintiff’” in the 
Westlaw All Federal library returned 339 cases on March 29, 2019.  On the same date, the 
search “adv:  negligence & ‘summary judgment #in favor #of plaintiff’” in the Westlaw All 
States library yielded 1042 cases.  The All States population of negligence cases must be much 
more than three times greater than the All Federal population of copyright cases, suggesting 
that judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs is less common in negligence than in copyright 
cases.  When I searched the respective Westlaw libraries for “copyright” and “negligence,” 
to attempt to find the respective populations, the system returned 10,000 cases for each, the 
system default limit, which is uninformative. 
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appeals, intellectual property defendants possess practically no advantage 
on appeal.219 
A legal area’s ratio of judgments as a matter of law for defendants220 
to those for plaintiffs will not be the complete cause of defendants’ 
appellate advantage, but this causative factor should correlate well with 
other causes, such as the extent to which defendants are entitled to jury 
instructions encouraging juries to forgive defendants’ violations of legal 
standards and the like.  In a rational system, the causes of defendants’ 
appellate advantage should reflect courts’ concerns in different 
substantive areas about the cost of further (i.e., marginal) jury absolutions 
of violations together with the cost of marginal implementations by juries 
of excessive legal standards.  Defendants’ appellate success will be more 
related to the former and plaintiff’s appellate success more related to the 
latter.  Theoretically, however, either factor or both could influence either 
party’s appellate success.  An appellate court could find for a defendant 
                                                 
219 I have been unable to find the appellate win rates for copyright cases taken by 
themselves.  As for “intellectual property” appeals, see Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and 
Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases:  Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 672 (2004) (reporting that in intellectual property cases from 
1987–95, plaintiffs won 32.8% of their appeals and defendants won 36.7% of theirs, which is 
a much smaller disparity than for negligence and most other types of cases).  It is possible 
that defendants’ appellate advantage in copyright cases is even smaller than in the larger 
category of intellectual property cases.  See also John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. 
Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769 (2014) 
(depicting statistical analysis conducted on summary judgment rulings in patent litigation 
like, for example, patentees win a significant number of summary judgment motions in 
district courts on the issue of patent invalidity for most patents). 
 The most prominent comparison of cases in the literature is between employment 
discrimination cases for which defendants possess a large appellate advantage and 
negotiable instrument cases for which plaintiffs possess a modest appellate advantage.  See 
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts:  Civil Rights 
Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 (2002).  This result 
suggests that defendants in employment discrimination cases receive judgment as a matter 
of law much more commonly than do the plaintiffs in these cases but that in negotiable 
instrument cases, judgment as a matter of law is much more balanced between plaintiffs and 
defendants and even that plaintiffs get judgment as a matter of law more often than 
defendants, the opposite of the situation in negligence law and probably most other bodies 
of law.  See also Vivian Berger, Michael O. Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment 
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45 
(2005) (reporting that a large proportion of employment discrimination cases settle because 
either summary judgment is granted for the defendant or the defendant has threatened to 
motion for summary judgment). 
220 A judgment as a matter of law for one party or the other can be ordered by an appellate 
court as well as a trial court.  If, in a negligence case, an appellate court finds that all the 
defendant’s untaken precautions, as alleged by the plaintiff, exceeded the requirements of 
cost-benefit analysis, the court will often order judgment as a matter of law for the defendant, 
as by reversing a trial court’s refusal to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the 
defendant after a plaintiff’s verdict. 
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because it thought that juries in that area of law had adopted appropriate 
levels of forgiveness (and so this jury should be permitted to forgive) or 
because it thought that this jury had implemented an excessive legal 
standard.  As noted at the beginning of the discussion, with almost the 
same level of appellate reversals in favor of defendants (31.0% and 32.1%, 
respectively), plaintiffs possess only a 12.5% reversal rate in motor vehicle 
negligence cases but a 24.2% reversal rate in medical malpractice cases.  
Appellate courts may be assessing that the current rate of jury forgiveness 
of defendants in motor vehicle negligence cases is appropriate with 
deterrence goals in mind but that jury forgiveness in medical malpractice 
cases is excessive in terms of what patients lose through diminished 
deterrence of medical errors. 
This conception of the problem assumes that some positive benefit 
comes from jury decision-making because both excessive jury forgiveness 
and excessive jury standards impose unique costs vis à vis bench trials.  
Positive levels of jury forgiveness and excessive standards are probably 
beneficial in some areas of law for their own unique reasons and because 
both “errors” promote settlement by increasing the economic risk of trial, 
that is, the variance of different trial results upon the same or similar 
facts.221 
With intellectual property, the contractual economy depends on 
certainty.  Any uncertainty, which would certainly result from 
widespread jury forgiveness of copyright infringement, would operate as 
a tax upon the benefits of copyright law.  Thus, courts may award 
judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs in large numbers of copyright 
cases to prevent jury forgiveness of defendants.  With negligence, by 
contrast, contractual certainty is not as important, largely because 
insurers—the main contractual players—can rely on the predictability of 
the large numbers of potential negligent auto accidents in their insurance 
books, whether juries forgive or not.222  In addition, full liability for all 
inadvertent negligence—the most common type—could 
counterproductively incentivize overprecaution because inadvertent 
                                                 
221 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability:  Optimal Incentives for 
Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562 (1991) (noting that uncertainty in law can lead to 
positive legal results that both compensate the plaintiff and deter the defendant); Tom Baker, 
Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law:  An Experimental Approach, 89 
IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) (analyzing how uncertainty in law can lead to positive legal results 
in both criminal and tort law).  But see J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational 
Litigant:  Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989) (finding 
that Japanese courts produce so much certainty in auto accident cases that it promotes 
settlement). 
222 See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 
1540–43 (1987) (explaining why the law of large numbers often makes insured risks 
predictable to insurance companies). 
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negligence is sometimes efficient, notably in the auto-accident arena.  
Copyright infringement, by contrast, is more often intentional and more 
likely to be inefficient on its face.  Thus, jury forgiveness of copyright 
infringement would be counterproductive from that perspective as well.  
Therefore, when the statistic is finally revealed, I predict a smaller 
appellate advantage for defendants in copyright cases than in motor 
vehicle negligence cases. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The classical economic theory of negligence was basically a translation 
of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s theory of negligence.  It even extended it.  
Nevertheless, theories can blind us to reality as much as they can help us 
see it more clearly.  It is a remarkable tribute to Holmes’s analytical and 
rhetorical skills how influential his theory still remains even though legal 
practice falsifies it with practically every new negligence case. 
Grady: The American Negligence Rule
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
